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Abstract
There is a split among state courts about whether personal
jurisdiction over an alleged domestic violence perpetrator is required
in order to obtain a civil protection order preventing the defendant
from contacting the victim. Some courts have held that such orders
interfere with the defendant’s liberty interests, and therefore personal
jurisdiction is a requirement under the Due Process Clause for the
validity of such orders. Other courts have held that personal
jurisdiction is not required because such protection orders are
analogous to custody and divorce orders which have historically been
entered by courts without establishing personal jurisdiction over the
other party under the “status exception.” This Article argues that the
focus on the status exception is misplaced and that instead, courts
should reframe the way they look at personal jurisdiction in domestic
violence cases by applying the principals embedded in the stream of
commerce doctrine and the effects test. Drawing upon common
threads from each line of cases, the Article proposes a test for
domestic violence jurisdiction that focuses on the knowledge of the
defendant about the victim’s likely destination if she is forced to flee
to another state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Alan Burnett had a history of making violent threats against his wife. He
repeatedly told Caren Burnett throughout their seven year marriage that if
she ever left him, he would kill her and “go to jail” leaving their three
children to live with his parents. At one point, he even described a
gruesome plan to kill her and hide the evidence using a wood chipper.
Caren finally decided she had enough and fled from her husband in Florida
to her father’s house in Sandusky County, Ohio. Upon arriving in Ohio, she
promptly filed a motion for a domestic violence civil protection order and
presented evidence of Alan’s serious threats and the fact that he “knew all
the places she would go” to flee from him. The trial court entered an order
of protection, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that the
trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Alan, leaving Caren with an
impossible choice: either risk her own safety by traveling to Florida to seek
an order of protection or wait for Alan to come to Ohio and threaten her and
her children sufficiently to give rise to jurisdiction in Ohio.
This Article argues that people like Caren should not be forced into such a
difficult decision. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does protect out of state residents from being subject to personal jurisdiction
in states with which they have no connection, but when a person engages in
conduct that they know or should know is likely to have an impact in
another state, courts have shown a willingness in other contexts to allow the
assertion of personal jurisdiction in those states. Manufacturers may be
subject to jurisdiction when they place a product into the stream of
commerce that they know or should know will end up in a particular forum
even if the manufacturer never sold products directly to a buyer in that
forum. Intentional tortfeasors may be subject to personal jurisdiction when
they engage in tortious conduct that they know will have an effect in
another forum, even if the tortfeasor never set foot in that forum.
When a person like Alan Burnett engages in a pattern of threatening
conduct toward a person he knows will be likely to seek refuge in a
particular place—the place he knows her family lives—he should likewise
be subject to personal jurisdiction in that place. This Article argues that
courts should reframe the personal jurisdiction inquiry in the context of
domestic violence in the same way they have framed that inquiry in these
other contexts: by holding the defendant responsible for the knowledge he
possesses about the likely results of his actions. This approach is a more
coherent one than the “status” approach, which has been at the center of this
debate in lower courts and which seeks to exempt domestic violence
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restraining orders from personal jurisdiction requirements altogether by
analogizing those orders to divorce and custody actions.
Part II.A will describe the historical context in which the status exception
arose and its current justifications. Part II.B will examine the debate in the
courts over whether the status exception should apply to domestic violence
cases.1 Part III will explain why the status exception is not an appropriate
vehicle for dealing with interstate domestic violence cases. Part IV will
describe the development of the stream of commerce doctrine and the
effects test and draw common threads from those lines of cases that are
applicable to the domestic violence context. Part V will weave those
common threads into a “Knowledge Test” for domestic violence cases that
asks whether the defendant was aware the victim was likely to flee to the
forum. Part VI will address potential objections to the Knowledge Test.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDERS
In most civil actions, it is a prerequisite to entering a judgment against a
defendant that the court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.2
Personal jurisdiction can be acquired by in-state service on a defendant
voluntarily present in the state,3 with the defendant’s consent, 4 or by
establishing that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum such
that haling the defendant into court there is consistent with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.5
However, there has long been an exception to these requirements for cases
that concern a determination of the plaintiff’s “status.” This status
1

This article uses the phrase “domestic violence cases” to refer to civil proceedings by
plaintiffs seeking domestic violence restraining orders, not criminal cases where the
defendant is charged with a domestic violence related offense.
2
See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 68 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is the power of a
tribunal to subject and bind a particular person or entity to its decisions.”).
3
See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 616-19
(1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.); id. at 628-29 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Cody Jacobs, If
Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play Tag?, 46 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript
at
12,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560553).
4
See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 (1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived. . . . A variety of legal
arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal
jurisdiction of the court.”).
5
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. &
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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exception allows a court to determine the legal status of a person properly
before the court, even if that status has an impact on another person over
whom the court may not be able to obtain personal jurisdiction.6 Courts
have relied upon this exception to grant divorces even in situations where
the court has jurisdiction over only one of the spouses.7 Similarly, courts
have entered child custody orders when the children at issue reside in a
forum even when the court lacks jurisdiction over one of the parents.8
There is a split in the lower courts over whether the status exception applies
to actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders against out of state
defendants.9 Some courts hold that such orders do not fall into the status
exception at all and that, therefore, in the absence of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, no restraining order may be issued.10 Other courts hold
that the exception does apply to such orders because they merely concern
the protected “status” of the person seeking the order.11 However, many of
the courts that have found the status exception applicable to domestic
violence restraining orders have held that due process requires some serious
limitations on the scope of such orders when the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.12
A. The Status Exception
Although a version of the status exception was already followed by state
courts at the time,13 the exception was fully entrenched in jurisdictional
jurisprudence by dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v.
Neff.14 In that case, the Court declared for the first time that the recently
ratified Fourteenth Amendment placed constitutional limits on state courts’
6

See Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 813, 815-16 & n.10 (1995).
7
Id. at 815-18.
8
Id.
9
Some courts style the person seeking a restraining order as the “petitioner” and the
person against whom the order is sought as the “respondent,” while others refer to the
parties simply as the plaintiff and defendant respectively. For clarity, this article adopts the
latter nomenclature throughout.
10
See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 926-27 (Vt. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 952
(2015); Becker v. Johnson, 937 So. 2d 1128, 1130-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); T.L. v.
W.L., 820 A.2d 506, 512-15 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003).
11
See, e.g., Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 581-82 (N.H. 2010); Caplan v.
Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 122-25 (Mass. 2008); Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10
(Iowa 2001).
12
See Part II.B.1, infra.
13
Wasserman, supra note 6, at 824
14
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevented state courts from exercising
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants unless the defendant
made a voluntary appearance in court or was served with process while
physically present in the state.15 However, the Court described an important
limitation on its holding:
To prevent any misapplication of the views
expressed in this opinion, it is proper to
observe that we do not mean to assert, by any
thing we have said, that a State may not
authorize proceedings to determine the status
of one of its citizens towards a non-resident,
which would be binding within the State,
though made without service of process or
personal notice to the non-resident. The
jurisdiction which every State possesses to
determine the civil status and capacities of all
its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe
the conditions on which proceedings affecting
them may be commenced and carried on
within its territory.16
Thus, the Court carved out a special exception for cases involving the status
of the plaintiff as opposed to the personal rights of the defendant. In those
cases, the Court found no due process problem with state courts
determining the status of in-state plaintiffs even where the adjudication of
that status would have a clear impact on the defendant.
The status exception has been widely accepted by courts as a means of
conducting what scholars call “ex parte divorce” actions—divorces where
the state lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant
spouse.17 The status exception has also been used to justify the adjudication
of child custody disputes where the child is physically present in the forum
15

Id. at 733. As discussed in Part IV, infra, these traditional bases of jurisdiction have
since been augmented by the minimum contacts framework. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
316.
16
Id. at 734 (emphasis in original).
17
See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 816 n.13 (noting that the phrase “ex parte divorce”
is something of a misnomer because—at least in modern times—courts do require notice to
the defendant in such cases even if they do not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant).
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state but the forum lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the parents. 18 In
order to understand why courts disagree about whether this exception
applies to domestic violence cases, it is first necessary to understand why it
does apply in these contexts and to examine the limitations courts have
placed on its application.
1. Divorce & Child Custody
The application of the status exception to divorces rose to prominence
during the nineteenth century—a time when society and the law took a very
different view of marriage than today. Once a man and woman were
married, they essentially became a single unit in the eyes of the law, but it
was the husband who had almost all of the power to control this marital
unit.19 The husband became the sole owner of all of his wife’s property
upon marriage, and was entitled to all wages, bequests, and gifts the wife
received during marriage.20 A married woman had no right to make
contracts and—at least in some states—no right to work at all without the
permission of her husband.21 At the same time, the number of divorces was
rising dramatically22 and the most common ground23 for divorce was
desertion or abandonment.24
A woman who found herself abandoned by her husband was left in a
precarious situation if the husband fled to another state. She would be
unable to support herself financially because of patriarchal marital laws, but
also unable to obtain a divorce from her absent husband because of the
territorial view of personal jurisdiction that prevailed at that time. This
concern at least partially motivated the Pennoyer court’s entrenchment of
the status exception for divorces.25
In the child custody context, many courts historically held that personal
18

See id. at 816-18.
See id. at 824-25 (“[I]n the eyes of the law the husband and wife were one person —
the husband.”) (quoting NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE
AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 42 (1982)).
20
See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 824-25.
21
See id. at 825-26.
22
See id. at 828 & n.73.
23
The first “no fault” divorce law did not go into effect until over a century after
Pennoyer. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 83 (1991).
24
See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 830; Neal R. Feigenson, Extraterritorial
Recognition of Divorce Decrees in the Nineteenth Century, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119,
123 (1990).
25
See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 832.
19
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jurisdiction over both parents was not required where the child was subject
to personal jurisdiction in the forum.26 However, courts were divided about
the rationale for doing so. Some relied on the “status” rationale while
others relied on a “physical presence” rationale that analogized the child to
property.27 Still other courts held that personal jurisdiction over both
parents was in fact required in child custody cases.28
The confusion among courts on this point was clarified29 by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), which was enacted by all 50
states by 1981.30 The UCCJA adopted the view that the status exception
applied to child custody determinations, making the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over both parents unnecessary for a court to render a custody
judgment.31 Although some commentators have questioned the UCCJA’s
26

See Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 369, 378 (1991).
27
Wasserman, supra note 6, at 867-68; Atwood, supra note 26, at 377-78.
28
Wasserman, supra note 6, at 863-64; Atwood, supra note 26, at 377. The Supreme
Court’s decision in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) appeared to adopt this position
when a five Justice majority held that Ohio courts did not have to recognize a custody
judgment entered by a Wisconsin court awarding sole custody of three children to their
father when the Wisconsin court lacked personal jurisdiction over the mother. Id. at 52829. However, in a concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter stated that he was joining the
Court’s opinion with the understanding that the Court’s only holding was that the Full Faith
and Credit clause did not require Ohio to recognize Wisconsin’s judgment, but that nothing
(presumably including the Due Process Clause) prevented Ohio from choosing to recognize
that judgment if it had wanted to do so. Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). While
some courts read May expansively as precluding child custody judgments without
jurisdiction over both parents, others followed Justice Frankfurter’s interpretation, while
still others ignored May altogether. See David J. Benson, Can A Case Be Made for the Use
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in Child Support Determinations?, 26
GONZ. L. REV. 125, 132 (1991); Atwood, supra note 26, at 370. Thus, May ultimately
failed to provide much clarity on this issue. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 28, at 132; see
also In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 452 (1981). (noting that May “has
been of relatively slight importance” in the evolution of child custody jurisdiction
jurisprudence).
29
Atwood, supra note 26, at 403 n.4 (“One cannot deny that the jurisdictional
landscape is much more ordered today than in pre-UCCJA times.”); but see Christopher L.
Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 361-62 (1986)
(noting that even after the UCCJA, “problems still remain” and “many questions must still
be answered before one may assess the effectuality of the legislative scheme to resolve the
problems of child custody jurisdiction.”).
30
See BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC. DOM. REL. L., § 17:23 History of the UCCJEA (4th ed.).
31
See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 12 cmt. (amended 1999), 9-1 U.L.A. at
274 (“There is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory
that custody determinations . . . are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status.”);
see also Atwood, supra note 26, at 378-79 (“Many modern courts, relying on assertions in
the commentary to the UCCJA, have likewise embraced the status doctrine, reasoning that

10-Feb-16
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constitutionality on this point,32 modern courts have largely upheld the
application of the status exception to custody determinations.33
2. Justification & Limitations
The status exception is primarily justified by the sovereignty a state
possesses over persons within its borders. As the Supreme Court argued in
the early twentieth century, it would improperly abrogate that sovereignty if
a state were “deprived, directly or indirectly, of its sovereign power to
regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects and citizens, by the fact
that the subjects and citizens of other states, as related to them, are
interested in that status.”34 The basic idea is that states have a special
interest in making sure that the status of its residents with respect to
important matters such as child custody and divorce is not left unclear.35 A
related justification that has been commonly offered for the status exception
is a practical one: if personal jurisdiction were required to obtain a divorce
or make a child custody determination, it may be very difficult or
impractical for such cases to be litigated at all in cases where no forum has

personal jurisdiction is unnecessary because child custody determinations are
determinations of a child’s familial status, similar to determinations ‘in rem.’”).
32
See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparativist Ruminations from the Bayou on
Child Custody Jurisdiction: The UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction, 58 LA. L. REV. 449, 507 (1998); Wasserman, supra note 6, at 868, 891-92.
33
See, e.g., In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 696-98 (Vt. 2011); Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So.
2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); In Interest of S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.
1992); Matter of Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Kan. App. 1989); Leonard, 122
Cal. App. 3d at 457-59; Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 268 S.E.2d 648, 650-51 (Ga. 1980); but see
Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984) (“A child custody determination is an in
personam proceeding requiring in personam jurisdiction over the affected parties.”)
(citations omitted).
34
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166 (1901) (quotations and citation omitted);
see also, e.g., Williams v. State of N. Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942) (“[I]t is plain
that each state by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the
institution of marriage can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse
domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent.”).
35
See R.W., 39 A.3d at 696 (“In its role as parens patriae, Vermont is responsible for
the welfare of resident children and has a strong interest in assuring they are safe and well
cared for.”) (collecting cases); Von Schack v. Von Schack, 893 A.2d 1004, 1011 (Me. 2006)
(“Maine has a unique interest in assuring that its citizens are not compelled to remain in
such personal relationships against their wills[.]”); Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever
Getting Back Together: Domestic Violence Victims, Defendants, and Due Process, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 172 (2013) (noting that “the underlying rationale of allowing a state
to adjudicate the status of a relationship . . . to protect vulnerable persons within its
borders.”); see also May, 345 U.S. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Children have a
very special place in life which law should reflect.”).
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personal jurisdiction over both spouses or parents.36
While these reasons and others37 have justified courts’ exercise of
jurisdiction for the purpose of terminating a marriage or determining child
custody, they have not been deemed sufficient to justify courts’ exercise of
jurisdiction over ancillary matters such as alimony and child support that
involve the property interests of people over whom the court lacks personal
jurisdiction.38 This is because, as the Supreme Court explained in Estin v.
Estin, the case that established this dichotomy with respect to divorce, the
considerations that justify the application of the status exception to divorce
proceedings have “little relevancy” when it comes to disputes over property
interests.39 Instead, the Court held, such disputes—even though they may
involve marital property or children—were more analogous to disputes over
other financial issues, and states have “no power . . . to determine the
personal rights of” a defendant in the absence of personal jurisdiction.40
Thus, the Court made divorce “divisible”—giving effect to divorce decrees
entered without personal jurisdiction over one spouse but refusing to do the
same with respect to other aspects of divorce such as property division and
alimony.41 The Court has similarly held that personal jurisdiction is
required to render a judgment for child support against a non-resident
defendant even where the child resides in the forum.42
36

See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 663 N.W.2d 734, 744
(Wis. 2003) (“A conclusion that minimum contacts are necessary for child custody
determinations ignores the realities of child custody proceedings . . . . A requirement of
minimum contacts would necessitate that a child travel to the state in which his or her
parent resides. . . . In the case of an abandoned child whose parents live in different states,
the child might be required to travel to both states to have his or her rights determined.
Custody determinations involving parents living in foreign nations would pose further
complications.”) (citations omitted); Wasserman, supra note 6, at 832 (“The Pennoyer
Court was concerned that an abandoned spouse might be unable to obtain a divorce under
the laws of the state to which her partner had fled, and thus would be unable to divorce. . . .
In cases in which the husband’s whereabouts were unknown, an ex parte divorce was the
wife’s only avenue of redress; personal service was not possible.”) (citation omitted).
37
See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 851-53 (discussing other rationales for the status
exception).
38
See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948); Jurado v. Brashear, 782 So. 2d
575, 576 n.2 (La. 2001).
39
Estin, 334 U.S. at 547.
40
Id. at 548-49.
41
See id. at 549.
42
See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 101 (1978). Kulko did not directly
address the applicability of the status exception. See id. at 92 (noting that the parties were
in agreement that the minimum contacts test governed the case). However, since Kulko
was decided, courts have uniformly refused to allow the entry of orders for child support
under the status exception. See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R.,
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Even with these limitations—and perhaps in part because of them—the
status exception has been subject to significant criticism by scholars. Some
have argued that the doctrine improperly privileges property rights over
substantive due process rights associated with familial relationships by
requiring personal jurisdiction when the former is at issue, but not requiring
it when the latter is at issue.43 Others have argued that the status exception
has outlived the reasoning that justified its creation.44 Finally, some
scholars have argued that the status exception is inconsistent with modern
personal jurisdiction doctrine’s focus on fairness instead of states’ sovereign
authority over people within their borders.45 Nevertheless, the status
exception remains deeply embedded in family law practice.
B. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders & The Status Exception
Because of the close link between the law of domestic violence and family
law,46 courts have debated whether the status exception should be expanded
to cover the entering of restraining orders against out of state domestic
violence perpetrators. Some courts have applied the status exception to
domestic violence restraining orders on the theory that such orders merely
concern the protected “status” of the plaintiff.47 Most courts embracing this
rationale have limited the relief available in such restraining orders by
refusing to include “affirmative” relief in those orders.48 Other courts have
262 Wis. 2d 217, 229, 663 N.W.2d 734, 740 n.5 (Wis. 2003); Warwick v. Gluck, 751 P.2d
1042, 1045 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988); Rosemarie T. Ring, Personal Jurisdiction and Child
Support: Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship As Minimum Contacts, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1125, 1152 (2001).
43
See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 6, at 821.
44
See Section III.A, infra; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce
Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1710-11
(2011) (“[T]here are no longer any persuasive justifications for exempting a claim for
divorce from the rules that apply to other civil actions.”).
45
See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction:
Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 52 (1984) (“After Shaffer,
Rush, and Ireland, the ‘res' and ‘forum state interest’ justifications for casual jurisdiction in
divorce cases simply will not suffice.”).
46
See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving
Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 223-31
(2011); see also Margaret Drew, Lawyer Malpractice and Domestic Violence: Are we
Revictimizing Our Clients?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 7, 10-11 (2005) (“Many states have incorporated
the protective order statute within the domestic relations code. . . . Within the exclusive
confines of family law are many statutory enactments that address the impact of abuse on
families.”) (citation omitted).
47
See, e.g., Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 6-10.
48
See, e.g., Caplan, 450 Mass. at 468-72.
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refused to apply the status exception to domestic violence restraining orders
at all, finding that restraining orders are not analogous to mere declarations
of the plaintiff’s status because they are restraints on the defendant’s
liberty.49
1. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders: A Protected Status?
In Bartsch v. Bartsch,50 the plaintiff and defendant both grew up in Iowa,
met at Iowa State University, and were married in Iowa.51 Although the
parties moved to Utah shortly after their marriage, both of their families
remained in Iowa.52 After the move to Utah, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant physically abused her by—among other things—pushing her and
threatening her with a gun.53 Likely in an effort to flee from her abuser, the
plaintiff moved with her child back to Iowa and filed an application for a
protective order shortly after arriving.54 The defendant moved to dismiss
the application on the grounds that the Iowa court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him.55
The Iowa Supreme Court first summarily rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that Iowa courts did in fact have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
based on his contacts with Iowa.56 The court simply noted that—although
the defendant “maintained substantial ties to Iowa prior to” moving, “he has
had virtually no ties to Iowa since that time, except that his wife and child
now” lived there.57
However, the court held that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
unnecessary for the entry of a protective order.58 After laying out the status
exception and examining its application to divorce and child custody
matters, the court drew parallels to these areas to justify extending the
exception to domestic violence restraining orders.59 The court noted that
49

See, e.g., Fox, 106 A.3d at 926.
636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001).
51
Appellee’s Final Brief at 4, Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001) (No. 000068).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 5. The defendant also allegedly physically abused the parties’ minor child. Id.
at 6.
54
See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 5.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 6.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 7-8.
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one of the justifications for the status exception in the marriage context is
the state’s interest in preventing bigamy and protecting the offspring of such
marriages from being illegitimate and observed that the “greater and more
immediate risk of harm” involved in domestic violence was an “even more
compelling” reason for applying the status exception in the domestic
violence context.60 The court also argued that one of the primary
justifications for the status exception in the child custody context—
protecting child residents of the state—was equally applicable to protecting
adult residents from domestic violence.61 Thus, the court concluded that in
light of the special solicitude Iowa’s domestic violence statute aims to
provide victims and the court’s belief that “[f]uture violence ought to be
constrained in any state in which the victim is located,” Iowa courts should
be able to enter protective orders in the absence of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. 62
The Bartsch decision was the first to explicitly adopt this approach,63 and it
has proven influential as courts in several states have cited Bartsch to enter
domestic violence retraining orders in cases where the court purportedly
could not assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant under traditional
rules.64 However, many of these cases have limited Bartsch by refusing to
apply the status exception to aspects of domestic violence restraining orders
that include what can be characterized as affirmative obligations on the
defendant.
A leading case making this distinction is Shah v. Shah.65 There, the
plaintiff sought a restraining order against her husband in a New Jersey
court after fleeing from the couple’s marital home in Illinois.66 The plaintiff
fled to New Jersey to stay with family friends there after allegedly being
threatened and falsely imprisoned by her husband.67 The trial court granted
a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendant from harassing the
60

Id. at 9.
See id. at 7-9.
62
Id. at 9-10 (quotations and citation omitted).
63
At least one state—Illinois—had previously enacted a statute which tied jurisdiction
in domestic violence cases to the jurisdictional test used in child custody cases under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See Gasaway v. Gasaway, 246 Ill. App. 3d 531,
534 (1993). As in Section II.A.1, supra, that test is premised upon the applicability of the
status exception.
64
See, e.g., Hemenway, 992 A.2d at 581-82; Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 122-25.
65
875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005).
66
Id. at 933.
67
Id.; Shah v. Shah, 860 A.2d 940, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (noting that
the charges in the original petition included “terroristic threats, criminal restraint, false
imprisonment, and harassment[.]”).
61
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plaintiff or otherwise having any contact with her and prohibiting the
defendant from possessing any firearms.68 The order also required the
defendant to surrender firearms he currently possessed, and to continue
medical coverage for the plaintiff under his health plan.69 The defendant
argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he
had “never set foot in New Jersey.”70
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that New Jersey courts could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under these circumstances
but nevertheless approved the entry of a protective order.71 Like the court
in Bartsch, the court held that orders prohibiting acts of domestic violence
are “addressed not to the defendant but to the victim [because such orders]
provid[e] the victim the very protection the law specifically allows, and
prohibi[t] the defendant from engaging in behavior already specifically
outlawed” and therefore do not impact the defendant’s “substantive
rights.”72 However, the court held that the same was not true of portions of
the order that constituted “attempts to exercise [the court’s] coercive power
to compel action by a defendant over whom the court lacks personal
jurisdiction.”73 Thus, the order was affirmed to the extent it simply
prohibited the defendant from contacting the plaintiff, but reversed to the
extent it placed other requirements on him such as requiring him to
surrender his firearms.74
Other courts have followed Shah’s approach by requiring personal
jurisdiction for portions of protective orders that impose “affirmative”
obligations on defendants but not requiring it for orders that merely prohibit
the defendant harassing or abusing the plaintiff.75 For example, in Spencer
v. Spencer,76 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the distinction
made by the Shah court “represents the fairest balance between protecting
68

Shah, 875 A.2d at 933.
Id.
70
Id. at 936.
71
Id. at 940.
72
Shah, 875 A.2d. at 939. Although the court declined to rely explicitly on the status
exception, see id. at 940 n.5, its rationale—that the plaintiff is being granted “protection”
and the defendant’s rights are not substantively impacted—is the same rationale supporting
the applicability of the status exception. See Fox, 106 A.3d at 925 (“Although the ‘status’
rationale and the ‘it’s-a-mere-prohibitory-order’ rationale are analytically distinct, they are
connected.”).
73
Shah, 875 A.2d at 939.
74
See id. at 939-42.
75
See, e.g., Hemenway, 992 A.2d at 581-82; Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 123-24; Spencer v.
Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
76
191 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
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the due process rights of the nonresident defendant and the state’s clearlyarticulated interest in protecting” victims of domestic violence.77 Thus, in
that case, which also involved a plaintiff who had obtained a protective
order against a defendant over whom the court found it lacked personal
jurisdiction, the court affirmed the portions of the order that prevented the
defendant from contacting the plaintiff, but reversed those portions of the
order preventing the defendant from possessing firearms and ordering him
to attend domestic violence counseling.78
The reasoning of some of these cases is curious since even the purportedly
“negative” portions of these orders typically do more than merely prevent
the defendant from doing something that is already illegal. For example,
the orders in both Shah and Spencer prevented the defendants in those cases
from contacting the plaintiffs altogether, not merely from engaging in
illegal harassment.79 Although it is not fully articulated in all the cases, the
implicit justification for bridging this gap between what is already
forbidden by law and the extra protections these orders provide is the status
exception. As one court explained:
A court order that prohibits the defendant
from abusing the plaintiff and orders him to
have no contact with and to stay away from
her . . . serves a role analogous to custody or
marital determinations, except that the order
focuses on the plaintiff's protected status
rather than her marital or parental status.80
And, just like those other contexts where the status exception applies, the
relief available in domestic violence cases is limited to this purportedly
“status determining” relief as opposed to relief that directly impacts the
defendant’s liberty or property.

77

Id. at 19.
Id.
79
See id. at 19 (noting that the order prevented the defendant from approaching within
1000 feet of the plaintiff or members of her family or household); Shah, 184 N.J. at 329
(noting that the order prevented the defendant from “having any oral, written, personal,
electronic or other form of contact with plaintiff”) (quotations omitted).
80
Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 123.
78
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2. Harsh Results: No Status Exception, No Protection
Not all courts have agreed that the status exception should apply to
domestic violence cases. Several courts have found that protective orders—
no matter what relief they include—are direct restraints on defendants’
liberty that require personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Unfortunately,
the courts reaching this conclusion have not explored other avenues of
asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, leaving the
victims in those cases without any relief at all.
For example, in Fox v. Fox,81 the plaintiff, a Vermont resident, was severely
beaten by the defendant, his nephew, after a contentious probate hearing in
New Hampshire involving the financial affairs and competency of the
defendant’s father.82 In the process of the confrontation and beating, which
took place in a parking lot, the defendant noted that the plaintiff had
Vermont license plates on his car and told the plaintiff that he was recording
the license plate number “should [he] need it again.”83 The plaintiff then
filed a petition for a protective order back in his home state of Vermont and
the defendant objected that Vermont lacked personal jurisdiction over
him.84
The Supreme Court of Vermont held that a final protective order could not
be issued without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 85 In
rejecting the conclusions reached by other courts, the court noted that
protective orders—even to the extent they merely prevent contact with the
plaintiff—do “more than prohibit [the] defendant from engaging in behavior
already specifically outlawed. [Such orders] prohibit[t] him from engaging
in behavior that would be entirely legal but for the court’s order.”86 The
court concluded that this restraint on the defendant’s liberty is not only a
81

106 A.3d 919 (Vt. 2014).
See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Fox, 106 A.3d 919 (No. 13-147), 2013 WL
3874104 (Vt.).
83
Id.
84
Fox, 106 A.3d at 921-22.
85
Id. at 923-26. The court explicitly declined to decide whether a temporary order
could issue without personal jurisdiction. Id. at 926. The court frames this conclusion as
being in accord with Shah, see id., however, the Shah court excluded permanent protective
orders based on the distinction that court drew between affirmative and prohibitory
portions of protective orders because permanent orders in New Jersey automatically
include numerous forms of affirmative relief. See Shah, 184 N.J. at 140 (“A final
restraining order must, by statutory definition, include affirmative relief.”) (citations
omitted). As described below, the Fox court explicitly rejected the affirmative/negative
relief distinction.
86
Fox, 106 A.3d at 926.
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declaration of the plaintiff’s status, but is also “an enforcement of a liability
arising from such a status” which could not be entered without obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under a traditional due process
analysis.87
The court acknowledged that it was reaching a “harsh result” and that
forcing a domestic violence victim to return to the state in which the abuse
occurred “may in some cases be logistically challenging, psychologically
difficult, or even personally dangerous.”88 However, the court was more
concerned with the “unpalatable possibilities” presented by the alternative
approach:
[A] Vermonter with no connection to, for
example, California could be forced to choose
between traveling from Vermont to California
to defend against civil charges of domestic
violence and accepting the consequences of a
judicial finding of abuse and an abuse
prevention order in California because an
alleged victim of domestic violence chose to
relocate to California.
Such a scenario
challenges ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” protected by the personal
jurisdiction requirement[.]89
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Vermont could assert
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under traditional jurisdictional
principals because of his apparent threat with respect to the plaintiff’s
Vermont license plate.90 The court held that because the defendant never
actually travelled to Vermont or attempted to contact the plaintiff in
Vermont, he did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Vermont and therefore could not be subject to
personal jurisdiction by Vermont courts.91
Other courts have similarly refused to enter protective orders of any kind
without personal jurisdiction.92 For example, in Burnett v. Burnett,93 the
87

See id.
Id. at 927, 929.
89
Id. at 927 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
90
Fox, 106 A.2d at 927-29.
91
Id. at 928-29.
92
See, e.g., Burnett v. Burnett, 2012-Ohio-2673, ¶¶ 11-23, 2012 WL 2196336, at *4-7
88
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troubling facts of which are described at the beginning of this Article, the
Court of Appeals of Ohio refused to assert jurisdiction over the non-resident
defendant unless the plaintiff could establish that Ohio courts had personal
jurisdiction over him.94 Although the defendant was well aware the plaintiff
had fled to Ohio and in fact had sent her threatening text messages since she
arrived there, the court refused to allow the entry of a protective order.95
The court’s decision left the plaintiff with no protective order at all despite
the obvious danger she faced from her husband.
*****
Thus, courts remain quite divided on the applicability of the status
exception to domestic violence cases and even those courts applying the
status exception have placed serious limitations on the scope of the
restraining orders issued in those cases. Although the next section argues
that the courts refusing to apply the status exception at all have the better of
the argument, courts on both sides of this debate do a disservice to domestic
violence victims by focusing solely on the status exception at the expense of
more carefully considering whether in personam jurisdiction may in fact be
available.
III. NO EASY WAY OUT: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVOLVES NO STATUS
When courts believe they are forced to choose between either applying the
status exception or denying an alleged victim of domestic violence any
relief at all, it is understandable that many courts have chosen to apply the
status exception. However, the status exception is not the “easy way out” it
appears to be. The status exception may no longer be consistent with
modern due process requirements. Even if the status exception remains
constitutionally valid, domestic violence protective orders are not
adjudications of status in the same sense as divorce and custody orders
because protective orders place real restraints on the defendant’s liberty.
Moreover, the limited relief courts are able to grant when operating under
the status exception in domestic violence cases is woefully inadequate to
protect victims and prevent further violence since courts are unable to grant

(Ohio Ct. App. 2012); Becker, 937 So. 2d at 1130-31; T.L., 820 A.2d at 512-15.
93
2012-Ohio-2673, 2012 WL 2196336.
94
See id. at *4.
95
2012 WL 2196336, at *6-7. Although the plaintiff attempted to argue that the text
messages provided a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction under traditional
principals, the court held that the messages were not properly in evidence so it did not
reach that issue. Id.
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so-called affirmative relief such as requiring defendants to relinquish
firearms or undergo counseling.
A. The Status Exception: Unconstitutional?
The Due Process Clause’s restriction on states’ ability to exercise personal
jurisdiction serves to protect individual liberty by ensuring that no person is
“subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established
no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.”96 The status exception boldly
purports to exempt divorce, custody, and (possibly) domestic violence
related disputes from this restriction and allow courts to render judgements
in those matters that are binding even over individuals who have not
targeted the forum where the court sits in any way. Even if the status
exception may have been justified when it was recognized by the Court in
Pennoyer, those justifications have been severely undercut by developments
in family law, technology, the law of personal jurisdiction, and
constitutional law that have occurred since that decision.
The status exception arose long ago in a time when both family law and the
law of personal jurisdiction were quite different than they are today. As
discussed in Part II.A, supra, in the Nineteenth Century, a wife who was
unable to obtain a divorce from her husband was often prevented by law
from supporting herself financially.97 Without the status exception, if a
woman’s husband left the state and the woman either did not know where
her husband went or was unable to travel there to file for a divorce, she
would have faced a very difficult situation. The status exception was seen
as a way to fix this problem by allowing a woman to obtain a determination
of her “status” as a single person, thus freeing her to support herself without
her husband.98
Of course, today, the law—and indeed constitutional law—takes a very
different view of women and marriage.99 The abandonment of one spouse
by the other does not alter the abandoned spouse’s ability to make a living.
96

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quotations and
citation omitted).
97
Supra, section II.A.1; but see 10 A.L.R. 778 (Originally published in 1921) (“The
general rule is to the effect that a wife who has been abandoned by her husband is entitled
to her subsequent earnings.”) (collecting cases dating as far back as 1737).
98
Supra, section II.A.1.
99
See Kerry v. Din, No. 13-1402, 2015 WL 2473334, at *7 (U.S. June 15, 2015)
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (“Modern equal-protection doctrine casts substantial doubt on the
permissibility of [coverture laws that create] such asymmetric treatment of women citizens
. . . and modern moral judgment rejects the premises of such a legal order.”).
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Moreover, because of massive technological changes, it is much easier
for an abandoned spouse to locate a wayward partner and, if necessary, to
travel to another state to litigate than it was in the Nineteenth Century. It is
still true that the status of being married changes—and in some ways
impairs—the property rights of each spouse101 and restricts the ability of
each spouse to remarry.102 However, these injuries are no worse than those
felt by potential plaintiffs with other kinds of claims who have to leave their
home state to litigate in another forum when their home state lacks personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
Perhaps the most significant change of all that has occurred since the status
exception was first established in Pennoyer is the rapid expansion of the
ability of states to assert jurisdiction over out of state defendants. At the
time Pennoyer was decided, personal jurisdiction could be established by a
court only if the defendant was served while physically present in the forum
or if the defendant consented to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction.103
Under this scheme, in the absence of the status exception, a spouse could
bring a divorce action only in the place where the other spouse happened to
be. This essentially would have given an abandoning spouse the ability to
unilaterally choose the forum for any divorce simply by deciding where to
go.104 Recognizing the status exception allowed courts to avoid this
inherently unfair consequence of the prevailing jurisdictional rules.
Today, although in-state service is still sufficient to confer jurisdiction, it is
not required.105 Instead, the scope of personal jurisdiction is much broader
as courts are able to assert jurisdiction over any person who has minimum
contacts with a forum such that the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.106 In the divorce
100

Modern developments have similarly undermined the rationale of preventing
illegitimacy—mentioned by the Iowa Supreme Court in Bartsch. Illegitimacy no longer
carries the social stigma that it once did, see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
140 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), nor does it carry the legal consequences it once did.
See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97-99 (1982).
101
For example, under some state laws, certain marital property cannot be alienated
without the consent of both spouses. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2347; Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 26.16.030;
102
See 10 C.J.S. Bigamy and Related Offenses § 2 (collecting anti-bigamy statutes).
103
Jacobs, supra note 3, at 5-6.
104
This requirement also risked the possibility that no forum would be available to
adjudicate the divorce since the spouse seeking the divorce may be unable to satisfy the
residency requirements of the state where the abandoning spouse fled. See 57 A.L.R.3D
221 (Originally published in 1974).
105
See id. at 12.
106
See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
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context, this means that even if one spouse flees to another state, the
abandoned spouse very likely could file for divorce in her home state even
without the status exception. The fact that the defendant spouse resided
with the plaintiff spouse in the marriage that gave rise to the action in the
forum state would likely be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the
minimum contacts test.107
A final change that undercuts the validity of the status exception is the
importance marriage and child rearing have gained as fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning
with Loving v. Virginia,108 the Supreme Court has recognized the right to
marry as a fundamental right that the state can only interfere with when
there is a compelling justification for doing so.109 Although the Court has
not always been consistent about the source of this right, 110 it is clear that at
least one basis for the right to marry is that it is a fundamental liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.111 Similarly, starting in the early
Twentieth Century, the Court also recognized a fundamental right of parents
to raise their children rooted in the Due Process Clause.112 Such rights were
107

See, e.g., Corr v. Corr, No. FA144124317S, 2015 WL 1758978, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2015) (“The defendant’s contacts with Connecticut prior to leaving
were substantial and give rise to specific jurisdiction. . . . [A] significant portion of the
parties’ marital life took place here in Connecticut.”); Oytan v. David-Oytan, 171 Wash.
App. 781, 806 (2012) (upholding the assertion of jurisdiction over a husband in an action
filed against him by his wife where “[b]etween 2007 and 2010, the parties lived in a marital
relationship in Washington and nowhere else.”); Akinci-Unal v. Unal, 64 Mass. App. Ct.
212, 217 (2005) (“The husband chose to come to Massachusetts, married here in a civil
ceremony, and lived here in a marriage for close to six years. Having voluntarily engaged
in a relationship that has legal consequences, the husband can scarcely be surprised by. . .
this State’s enforcement of the wife’s rights (if any) that arise from that relationship.
Certainly he does not defeat the Commonwealth’s power to act merely by leaving the
jurisdiction[.]”).
108
388 U.S. 1 (1967)
109
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (“Since our past decisions
make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification
at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that ‘critical
examination’ of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is required.”)
(citations omitted); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 WL 2473451, at *12
(U.S. June 26, 2015) (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the
right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”) (collecting cases).
110
Some cases have grounded the right in the Equal Protection Clause as well as the
Due Process Clause. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right
to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1386-87 (2010).
111
See, e.g., Obergefell, 2015 WL 2473451 at *12-17.
112
See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on
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not recognized or likely even contemplated at the time Pennoyer was
decided.113
Depriving a person of a “status” conferred at the state’s discretion is very
different than depriving that person of a fundamental right. Greater
procedural protections are required to satisfy due process when the state
seeks to deprive a person of a fundamental right than when other benefits
are at stake.114 The status exception does the opposite. It deprives out of
state defendants of their marriage or children with lesser procedural
protections than those afforded to defendants in other civil cases. It makes
no sense for the same Due Process Clause that elevates these relationships
to fundamental rights to also allow a state’s courts to end those relationships
without the minimum contacts the Clause requires in all other contexts.
Thus, the status exception was born out of particular circumstances that
existed at the time of its creation that are largely no longer applicable.
Without these special circumstances, it is hard to justify continuing to
adhere to such a radical departure from ordinary jurisdictional rules.
Although there are arguments for the continuing validity of the status
exception that are based on modern concerns, they are not entirely
convincing.

numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected.”) (collecting cases).
113
See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35 (“The State, for example, has absolute right
to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
205 (1888) (“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been
subject to the control of the legislature.”); Merry Jean Chan, Comment, The Authorial
Parent: An Intellectual Property Model of Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1192
(2003) (noting that the Supreme Court did not recognize parental rights under the Due
Process Clause until the 1920s); see also Obergefell, 2015 WL 2473451, at *48 (“This
Court’s earliest Fourteenth Amendment decisions appear to interpret the [Due Process]
Clause as using “liberty” to mean [only] freedom from physical restraint.”) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
114
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116-17, 121 (1996) (“M. L. B.’s case, involving
the State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the close
consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably
important is at stake. . . . Similarly here, the stakes for petitioner M. L. B.—forced
dissolution of her parental rights—are large, more substantial than mere loss of money.)
(quotations and citations omitted); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982)
(“When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents
with fundamentally fair procedures.”).
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In the divorce context, some may argue that with the advent of no fault
divorce, a defendant has a lesser interest in divorce proceedings.115 Since
the plaintiff will be able to obtain a divorce regardless of any defenses the
defendant might raise, the argument goes, there is no point in requiring
courts to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.116 However, as
Professor Rhonda Wasserman points out in an article arguing that the status
exception is unconstitutional, although every state has no fault divorce,
some states require the consent of both spouses in order to grant a divorce
on that basis.117 Moreover, the fact that a defendant is unlikely to have a
meritorious defense has never been a factor in personal jurisdiction analysis
in any other context.118 In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that
where a person has been deprived of something in a way that is contrary to
due process, “it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of
law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense
upon the merits.”119
In the child custody context, proponents of the status exception argue that
child custody is unique in that the interests of a third person—the child—
are primarily at stake rather than the interests of the parties.120 Accordingly,
a jurisdictional test that is “child-centered” rather than “defendant-centered”
is more appropriate and jurisdiction should be available wherever a child
resides whose custody needs to be determined.121 Without such a test—
proponents argue—it would be difficult if not impossible in at least some
cases to find a forum with personal jurisdiction over both parents.122

115

See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 851.
See id. at 851-52.
117
Id. at 851-53.
118
See, e.g., Fox, 106 A.3d at 929 (“The due process requirement that a court have
personal jurisdiction before entering a judgment against a defendant applies to those
defendants with meritorious defenses, as well as those without.”); Pounders v. Chicken
Country, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (“Appellants’ contention that the
appellee must show a defense to the action is contrary to the constitutional requirement for
the establishment of personal jurisdiction in order to adjudicate or exercise judicial power
over the parties.”).
119
Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1988) (quoting Coe v.
Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915)).
120
See, e.g., Brigitte M. Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction over Child
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229, 236-37 (1979);
see also Wasserman, supra note 6, at 888 n.381 (collecting sources making similar
arguments)).
121
See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarm, supra note 120, at 236-37, 252-53.
122
See id.at 252; see also Wasserman, supra note 6, at 886 (“For example, if one of the
parents has lived abroad for a number of years, a minimum contacts requirement could bar
any state court from determining the child’s custody.”).
116
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While the child’s interests are paramount in custody cases, that fact does not
decrease the parents’ highly important—and constitutionally protected—
interests in such proceedings. Moreover, litigating in a forum that has
personal jurisdiction over both parents may in fact be in the child’s best
interest because each parent will be more likely to appear and present a
strong and complete case to the court.123 Additionally, limiting the potential
fora to litigate child custody disputes may serve the beneficial purpose of
decreasing the likelihood of forum shopping—a practice that is particularly
troubling when the “shopping” requires moving children across state lines
to gain a litigation advantage. Finally, in the rare case when there is truly
no state with personal jurisdiction over both parents, the doctrine of
jurisdiction by necessity may be invoked.124
*****
To be sure, the arguments both in favor of and against the continuing
constitutionality of the status exception are more numerous and nuanced
than those presented here. A complete evaluation of the constitutionality of
the status exception is outside of the scope of this Article. However, the
serious doubts about the constitutionality of the status exception in even the
contexts where it has traditionally applied counsel against attempting to
expand the status exception to the very different context of domestic
violence.
B. Restraining Orders Do Not Alter Status
Even if the status exception remains constitutional, domestic violence
restraining orders fit poorly into that doctrine. The reason is simple: unlike
divorce and child custody cases, there is no “status” at issue for a court to
determine. In the former contexts, the issues that courts are adjudicating
change the plaintiff’s status in the eyes of the state: divorced or not
divorced; legal guardian or not. By contrast, in the context of domestic
violence restraining orders there is no similar status at issue. Instead,
actions seeking restraining orders are much more like actions seeking other
kinds of equitable relief where the court considers whether to order the
123

See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 888-89.
See id. at 887-88. The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity allows a court without
personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the traditional minimum contacts analysis to
nevertheless hear a case against that defendant where no forum would otherwise be
available to the plaintiff and the cause of action has some connection with the forum. See
Tracy Lee Troutman, Note, Jurisdiction by Necessity: Examining One Proposal for
Unbarring the Doors of Our Courts, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 401, 414-15 (1988).
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defendant to refrain from engaging in particular conduct. Courts and
commentators have come up with a variety of justifications for treating
domestic violence restraining orders as orders pertaining to status, but none
are persuasive on close examination.
Many of the courts discussed in Section II.B.1, supra, that have adopted the
status exception in domestic violence cases have argued that domestic
violence restraining orders bestow a “protected” status on the victim.125 For
example, in Bartsch, the Iowa Supreme Court argued that it was simply
“preserving the protected status accorded to the plaintiff by” Iowa’s
domestic violence statute.126 But that statute and others like it do not
contain any special protected status for plaintiffs. Rather, the Iowa statute
merely contains a list of restrictions that courts may place on defendants
such as orders prohibiting defendants from continuing to engage in
domestic abuse or going near a “plaintiff’s residence, school, or place of
employment.”127 While such orders certainly confer a benefit on the
plaintiff by protecting him or her from further abuse, it does not change the
plaintiff’s status in the eyes of the state in the same way that divorce and
custody orders do.128 Instead, restraining orders serve the same function as
equitable relief does in other civil actions for which personal jurisdiction is
a requirement: placing restrictions on the defendant’s conduct in order to
keep him from harming the plaintiff.129 Restraining orders cannot be
shoehorned into the status exception merely by labeling them as status
conferring.
Another argument that has appeared in some courts is that personal
jurisdiction is not necessary to enter a domestic violence restraining order
125

See, e.g., Caplan, 450 Mass. at 469; Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 6.
636 N.W.2d at 6.
127
Iowa Code Ann. § 236.5(b).
128
One could imagine a domestic violence statute that did confer a protected status on
a plaintiff in the eyes of the state. For example, a statute could provide that a person who is
found to be a victim of domestic abuse could be entitled to certain state benefits such as a
special monitor to quickly notify police of danger or counseling services to deal with
trauma. An order under a statute like that would indeed confer a status on the plaintiff
under state law and a court would likely be able to enter such an order without personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
129
See Bevan J. Graybill, Note, 'til Death Do Us Part: Why Personal Jurisdiction Is
Required to Issue Victim Protection Orders Against Nonresident Abusers, 63 OKLA. L.
REV. 821, 858 (2011) (“A victim protection order, which demands or forbids specific
behavior between the parties, alters the relationship between plaintiff and defendant to the
same degree as when the court enjoins one farmer from tilling the land of a neighboring
farmer. . . . Certainly, no one would argue this court order alters the status relationship
between the farmers.”).
126
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when that order merely prohibits conduct that is already illegal.130 In Shah,
for example, the court claimed that an order forbidding the defendant from
abusing the plaintiff simply prohibited behavior that is already specifically
outlawed.131 Under this view, the defendant is not being ordered to refrain
from doing anything he132 was not already prohibited from doing and
therefore there is no due process problem with forgoing traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis.
It is certainly true that the conduct that constitutes domestic abuse is illegal
with or without a restraining order. However, even an order that merely
prohibits the defendant from abusing the plaintiff133 carries with it
significant consequences for the defendant. For example, such an order
may have collateral consequences under federal law, including prohibiting
the defendant from possessing firearms.134 And, if the defendant violates an
order prohibiting him from abusing the plaintiff, he will face not only
charges for violating the statute prohibiting abuse, but also contempt
charges for violating the court’s order.135 Thus, it is simply not accurate
that a restraining order does nothing more than prohibit the defendant from
doing something that is already illegal. Such orders place real restrictions
on the defendant’s conduct and should be treated accordingly.
In what is probably the most comprehensive scholarly article advocating for
the extension of the status exception to at least some domestic violence
cases, Professor Jessica Miles argues that a protective order works a
“profound and fundamental” change in the status of the parties in relation to
130

See, e.g., Hemenway, 159 N.H. at 688; Shah, 184 N.J. 125, 137-38.
Shah, 184 N.J. at 137-38.
132
Although people of both genders are victims and perpetrators of domestic violence,
the overwhelming majority of domestic violence is perpetrated by men against women.
The use of gender neutral terminology under such circumstances may play a role in
obscuring the “gender-related causes and implications of domestic violence.” See, e.g.,
Kristen M. Driskell, Note, Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence,
20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 129, 129 n.1 (2009). Accordingly, when this Article refers to
domestic violence situations in the abstract, it will use male pronouns for the alleged abuser
and female pronouns for the alleged victim.
133
As discussed in Part II.B.1, supra, however, many of the cases making this
argument were actually approving orders that did more than prohibit conduct that was
already illegal.
134
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The combination of the status exception and this
collateral consequence raises similar constitutional concerns to those discussed in section
III.A., supra, since the right to bear arms, like the right to marry and raise children, is
constitutionally protected. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008);
cf. Part III.C., infra (discussing the importance of firearm restrictions to making restraining
orders effective).
135
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-30.
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each other in much the same way orders of legal separation do in divorce
cases.136 She notes that, while the “technical category of the legal
relationship between the parties remains unchanged by the entry of a
[protective order] (e.g., married couples remain married),” the status of the
relationship is changed because a protective order enjoins contact and
communication between the parties, therefore altering “the societal and
legal expectations and constraints attendant to [the] relationship.”137
Professor Miles concludes that this “change in relationship status” is
analogous to orders of legal separation, which are available under the status
exception.138
There are at least two flaws in this argument. First, the existence of a
“technical” legal status is an important triggering criterion for the
application of the status exception. Embracing a more practical definition
of “relationship status,” as Professor Miles advocates, would allow the
exception to swallow the rule. Almost any kind of injunctive relief changes
the relationship between the parties to a case by requiring one party to
refrain from doing something that they otherwise would have done in order
to confer some benefit on, or prevent some injury to, the other party. For
example, an order in a trademark case barring the defendant from using a
mark owned by the plaintiff gives the plaintiff control over the defendant’s
use of the mark that was absent prior to the litigation. Such an order
changes the legal expectations of the parties and also changes society’s
perception of who is the true owner of the mark. Yet, no one would argue
that trademark cases should fit into the status exception. Thus, the fact that
an order alters the relationship between the parties is not sufficient to bring
protective orders within the ambit of the status exception.
Second, as Professor Miles acknowledges, the relationship between the
parties in domestic violence cases is not always that of a married couple
such that they have a societal and legal expectation of being in frequent
contact.139 Many states allow victims of abuse suffered at the hands of
dating partners or non-spouse family members to obtain restraining orders,
and a few states even allow courts to grant restraining orders against
persons with whom the plaintiff has no familial or intimate relationship.140
Professor Miles argues that orders pertaining to these situations should also
be covered under the status exception out of respect for the power of states
136

See Miles, supra note 35, at 183.
Id.
138
Id.
139
See id. at 186.
140
See id. at 185-86 & n.267.
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to define family relationships.141 However, statutes that allow such orders
do not alter the definition of who is in a “family” merely because they are
classified as “domestic violence” statutes.142 Instead, they are concerned
with a much broader universe of people who are likely to be perpetrators of
abuse.
Finally, Professor Miles and some courts argue that applying the status
exception to domestic violence cases is good policy because it will give
victims the opportunity to seek relief without returning to the state where
their abuser lives and potentially endangering themselves in the process.143
A related argument is that the interests purportedly protected by domestic
violence restraining orders are at least as strong if not stronger than those
protected by marriage dissolution and custody orders covered by the status
exception.144
This argument is simply the result of the false choice between the status
exception and no relief for domestic violence victims who flee to other
states. If the status exception was indeed the only option for affording
victims protection, the stretching of the status exception to fit this situation
would be somewhat understandable, but it is not. Instead, as discussed in
Parts IV and V, infra, the stream of commerce doctrine and the effects test
provide the basis for a new framework for assessing personal jurisdiction in
domestic violence cases that will often result in the ability of courts to
exercise full in personam jurisdiction over out of state defendants. Once the
option of exercising in personam jurisdiction is on the table, the rationales
for extending the status exception to cover these cases become much less
compelling. Indeed, as discussed in the next section, the status exception’s
inherent limitations render it unable to provide adequate protection to
domestic violence victims through truly comprehensive protective orders.
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Id. at 186.
For example, prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, several states allowed courts to grant
domestic violence restraining orders against an intimate partner of the same sex while
refusing to recognize such relationships as valid marriages. Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. §
741.212 (effective Jun. 5, 1997) (the term ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife”) with Peterman v. Meeker, 855 So. 2d 690, 691
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Therefore, we conclude that the statute does not exclude those
persons who otherwise meet the requirements for a domestic violence injunction but seek
protection from a person of the same sex.”).
143
See, e.g., Caplan, 450 Mass. at 469-70; Miles, supra note 35, at 156-57.
144
See, e.g., Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 7-9.
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C. The Status Exception’s Critical Limitations
All courts that have expanded the status exception have at least implicitly
limited the protective orders available under the exception to those
containing only “prohibitory” relief (i.e., orders requiring the defendant to
refrain from doing something) rather than “affirmative” relief (i.e., orders
requiring the defendant to do something).145 The former includes orders to
stay away from the victim or cease abuse while the latter includes orders
requiring the defendant to relinquish firearms,146 attend counseling,147 or
turn over important documents or other property to the plaintiff.148
Assuming the validity of this distinction,149 the unavailability of affirmative
relief is a serious weakness of the status exception approach because these
forms of relief are often some of the most effective in preventing future
abuse. Similarly, the status exception does not allow domestic violence
victims to secure money judgments against abusers for child support or
other financial awards that may be critical to financial independence.
The link between gun violence and domestic violence is well established.150
An abuser is much more likely to kill his victim if the abuser has access to a
gun.151 Guns and domestic violence may make an even deadlier
145

See, e.g., Hemenway, 159 N.H. at 687-88; Caplan, 450 Mass. at 470-72; Spencer,
191 S.W.3d at 19; Shah, 184 N.J. at 137-38; see also Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 10 (not
directly addressing the affirmative/prohibitory relief distinction but noting that “[t]he order
here does not attempt to impose a personal judgment against the defendant. . . . The district
court merely ordered the defendant to ‘stay away from the protected party’ and not assault
or communicate with her[.]”) (citations omitted). Professor Miles similarly recognizes this
limitation. See Miles, supra note 35, at 197-200.
146
See Caplan, 450 Mass. at 472; Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19.
147
See Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19.
148
See Shah, 184 N.J. at 140.
149
A dubious assumption. See Part III.B, supra.
150
See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009) (“Firearms and
domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination[.]”) (citations omitted); United States
v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 167-68 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he use of firearms in connection with
domestic violence is all too common[.]”); United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“That firearms cause injury or death in domestic situations has been established
by empirical studies.”); Benjamin Thomas Greer & Jeffrey G. Purvis, Judges Going
Rogue: Constitutional Implications When Mandatory Firearm Restrictions Are Removed
from Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 275, 276
(2011) (“Domestic violence coupled with firearms is a volatile, and too often a lethal,
confluence of events”).
151
See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014) (“When a gun was in
the house, an abused woman was 6 times more likely than other abused women to be
killed[.]”) (quotations omitted) (citing Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate
Partner Homicide, DOJ, Nat. Institute of Justice J., No. 250, p. 16 (Nov. 2003)); United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Domestic assaults with
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combination after the victim has sought a restraining order because
“[d]omestic violence often escalates in severity over time”152 and abusers
may be particularly likely to escalate their attacks in order to retaliate
against the victim for seeking a restraining order.153 Empirical studies have
proven that protective orders that restrict the abuser’s use of firearms cause
a statistically significant decrease in the number of homicides that occur as
a result of domestic violence.154
Victims of domestic violence who flee to another state and seek a
restraining order under the status exception cannot obtain this critical
protection. This is particularly problematic since such protection may be
most needed in cases where victims of abuse flee to other states. In those
cases, victims have demonstrated their autonomy and independence from
their abusers by choosing not only to leave their abusers, but to leave the
state entirely. This kind of assertion of autonomy heightens the risk of
further abuse as the attacker is likely to attempt to reassert his dominance.155
Orders of protection entered pursuant to the status exception will not be
able to do anything to prevent these episodes of violence from escalating
through the use of firearms.
Court ordered counseling for batterers is also a common feature of modern
orders of protection that cannot be included in orders entered pursuant to

firearms are approximately twelve times more likely to end in the victim’s death than are
assaults by knives or fists.”) (citation omitted).
152
See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408.
153
See, e.g., Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change
Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 335 &
nn.150-51 (2011); see also Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Employers Know Best? The Application
of Workplace Restraining Orders to Domestic Violence Cases, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 175,
203 (2014) (“Researchers who have looked at the phenomenon of separation assault have
noted that batterers increase their aggression and lethality when their control is
threatened.”) (citations omitted); Carolyn V. Williams, Note, Not Everyone Will "Get It"
Until We Do It: Advocating for an Indefinite Order of Protection in Arizona, 40 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 371, 395 & n.182 (2008) (collecting cases “where an order of protection . . . did not
prevent the batterer from killing or abusing the victim.”).
154
See Greer & Purvis, supra note 150, at 281.
155
See, e.g., Shannon Selden, The Practice of Domestic Violence, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 1, 25-26 (2001) (“[W]omen who have left abusive relationships are often subject to
additional violence by partners who attempt to force them to return to the relationship.
These violent assaults also involve both a physical act and a verbal act that together
undermine the woman’s claim to recognition, autonomy, and assistance.”); Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 66 (1991) (“[W]omen describe coercive violence escalating after separation —
violence clearly aimed at denying their autonomy[.]”).
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the status exception.156 Although the effectiveness of such counseling is not
well established,157 there is at least some evidence that ordering batterers to
undergo treatment can decrease the likelihood that domestic violence will
recur.158 Moreover, this option can be particularly helpful when the parties
want to continue a relationship.159
Courts also sometimes order domestic violence defendants to turn over
important personal property the plaintiff has left in the defendant’s
possession. If the victim and her attacker share a home, the victim may
leave the house quickly and be unable to take important personal belongings
with her such as her birth certificate, social security card, or passport. In
fact, the leading case making the affirmative/negative relief distinction,
Shah, involved just such a situation.160 There, after the plaintiff—an Indian
citizen—had fled the marital home in Illinois to New Jersey and sought a
protective order against her husband, the trial court entered an order
requiring the defendant to return the plaintiff’s “work permit, social security
card, all immigration related documents and . . . personal mail.”161 The
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that portion of the trial court’s order
because it held the trial court had no power to grant such affirmative relief
in the absence of in personam jurisdiction.162 Thus, while the plaintiff
ostensibly gained an order protecting her from further attacks, she was left
156

See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 944 &
n.912 (1993) (noting that by 1993, at least 33 states authorized courts to order domestic
violence perpetrators to counseling as part of a protective order).
157
See Deborah Epstein et. al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies:
Prioritizing Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 467 n.3 (2003) (“Few experimental studies have
been conducted, and those that exist do not yet provide compelling evidence for treatment
effectiveness. . . . At the same time, research shows that women whose partners are
mandated to batterer treatment feel safer[.]”) (citation omitted).
158
See, e.g., Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations,
2 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 23, 31 (2000) ([T]here is ‘fairly consistent
evidence that [batterers’] treatment ‘works’ on a variety of dimensions and that effects of
treatment can be substantial.”) (citation omitted); Karen Tracy, Building A Model
Protective Order Process, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 475, 479 (1997) ([C]ourt-involved batterers
who are ordered to undergo counseling cannot easily terminate treatment on impulse,
arguably increasing the chance of rehabilitation.”); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and
Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 946 (1993) (“[O]verall, treated batterers reduced their
psychological abuse more than untreated offenders under court supervision.”) (citation
omitted).
159
See Mahoney, supra note 155, at 62.
160
The facts of Shah are described in more detail in Part II.B.2., supra.
161
Shah, 184 N.J. at 130.
162
Id. at 140-41.
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without the ability to even prove she was legally in the United States
without having to contact the person who allegedly abused her. This kind
of extremely difficult situation is likely not uncommon163 and represents
another glaring deficiency of protective orders grounded in the status
exception.
Finally, the status exception also fails to offer full protection because of the
bar on money judgments against the abuser. It is well-established that the
status exception does not allow a court to award alimony, child support, or
any other kind of money judgment.164 Whatever inconveniences this
distinction may cause in the divorce context, it is a crippling limitation in
the domestic violence context, where victims are often financially
dependent on their abusers and abusers often use that dependence as a
means to maintain control.165 Obtaining a protective order under the status
exception may be a hollow victory for a victim who will be unable to obtain
the monetary relief necessary to free herself from dependence on her
abuser.166
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See Comment, The Effects of Domestic Violence on Welfare Reform: An
Assessment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act As
Applied to Battered Women, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 600 (2002) (“Many women have
been killed after attempting to leave or while planning to leave abusive relationships. For
these reasons, women often leave quickly, take few belongings, and try to vanish without a
trace.”); cf. Dana Harrington Conner, To Protect or to Serve: Confidentiality, Client
Protection, and Domestic Violence, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 888 (2006) (“[T]he abuser may
threaten or harm what the victim cares about more than herself, such as . . . personal
items.”) (citing a survey showing that many victims of domestic violence report that the
abuser destroyed their personal property).
164
See, e.g., Estin, 334 U.S. at 547-49; Part II.A.3, supra.
165
See, e.g., Jamie Haar, Note, Women's Work: Economic Security in the Domestic
Violence Context, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 471, 473 (2014) (“Researchers say that
one of the main reasons women return to their abusers is out of need, specifically financial
need. Due to the abuser’s exercise of power and control over her through economic abuse,
she is not economically [self] sufficient and, therefore, is forced to return to her abusive
environment.”); Tracy, supra note 158, at 492 (“Although protective orders are generally
short-term in nature, long-term financial concerns may deter women from seeking
necessary protection. Family courts must address the disparate economic consequences of
divorce and separation on women.”); Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of
Domestic Violence, N.Y. ST. B.J., February 2011, at 40, 41 (“By controlling and limiting
the victim's access to financial resources, a batterer ensures that the victim will be
financially limited if he/she chooses to leave the relationship. As a result, victims of
domestic violence are often forced to choose between staying in an abusive relationship
and facing economic hardship, which could possibly result in extreme poverty and
homelessness.”).
166
Paula Pierce & Brian Quillen, No Contest: Why Protective Orders Provide Victims
Superior Protection to Bond Conditions, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 240 (2013).
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*****
Thus, the status exception fails to provide adequate relief to domestic
violence victims seeking protective orders.167 Nevertheless, the reliance on
the status exception is understandable given the underlying assumption that
in personam jurisdiction is unavailable in these cases; after all, something is
better than nothing. However, as I will demonstrate in the next two
sections, by reframing domestic violence jurisdiction using the stream of
commerce doctrine and effects test as a guide, courts will often be able to
assert in personam jurisdiction over out of state domestic violence
defendants.
IV. THE STREAM OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE & THE EFFECTS TEST
In many of the cases discussed above where courts considered the
applicability of the status exception to domestic violence cases, courts often
gave short shrift to the possibility of asserting in personam jurisdiction.
Courts usually dismissed this possibility because the defendant had never
set foot in the court’s jurisdiction and had a relatively small amount of
traditional “contacts,” if any, with the forum. However, in other contexts,
courts have developed doctrinal pathways for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over defendants who have little or no contact with a forum but
engage in intentional activity targeting a forum. Under the stream of
commerce doctrine, courts assert jurisdiction over companies who place
products into the stream of commerce with the knowledge that they will end
up in a particular forum and the intention that they do so. The effects test
allows courts to assert jurisdiction over intentional tortfeasors who target
another forum with their conduct. Although both of these doctrines are
often criticized for being muddled, they reflect a consensus that it is
consistent with due process to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in a forum
167

Professor Miles and some courts adopting the status exception in domestic violence
cases have also suggested that the exception should be limited to temporary as opposed to
permanent protective orders. See Miles, supra note 35, at 197-200. This limitation of the
status exception, if widely adopted, would at a minimum create an increased cost and
inconvenience for domestic violence victims by forcing them to continually go to court to
obtain renewal orders. See Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite
Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1082 (2014) (“For a
survivor seeking to end violence through a civil protection order, he or she must bear the
costs of transportation to and from court, daycare for children, and time away from work.
For the court case, there are often costs associated with receiving copies of 9-1-1
recordings, medical records, and police reports, and achieving personal service of the
petition and court documents.”); see also Williams, supra note 153, at 396 (“[R]enewing an
order of protection . . . forces a victim to confront the abuser again and again, leaving her
open to attack.”).
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he intentionally targets with the conduct that gives rise to a case, even if he
does not otherwise have any contacts with the forum.
A. The Stream of Commerce Doctrine
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, the bases for acquiring personal
jurisdiction over out of state defendants were rather limited. Essentially, a
defendant either had to be served while physically present in the forum or
had to consent to personal jurisdiction in the forum in order for a court to
assert personal jurisdiction over him.168 As discussed above, these
limitations were constitutionalized by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v.
Neff when the court held that any attempt to expand these traditional
methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction would violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.169
As the country’s economy changed with states growing more
interconnected and the role of corporations increasing, the Court felt
compelled to stretch Pennoyer to the breaking point in order to avoid
injustice in cases where defendants clearly directed their activities toward a
forum, but were nevertheless unable to be physically served in that
forum.170 Finally, the Court went in a different direction when it decided
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.171 In that case, the Court held for the
first time that a defendant could be constitutionally subject to personal
jurisdiction “where the defendant ha[s] certain minimum contacts with [the
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”172
In the years following International Shoe, the Court has further refined this
idea into a two part test. First, courts examine whether the defendant has a
minimum level of contacts with the forum to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant.173 Next, if such contacts are present, the
court must determine whether, in light of those contacts, asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant would comport with “fair play and
substantial justice.”174
168

See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 5.
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 728-29.
170
See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 6; Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Nineteenth Century
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in A Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387,
392-94 (2012).
171
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
172
Id. at 316 (quotations and citations omitted).
173
See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
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See, e.g., id.
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The Court has further clarified that—for a defendant’s contacts to be
sufficient under this test, the defendant must engage in “some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws.”175 Conversely, the “unilateral activity” of other parties to a
case has been deemed insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement.176
However, this requirement led to another seeming injustice brought on by
modern commerce. Companies could sell a product to a distributor, 177 who
could in turn sell the product to a consumer in a state where the original
company had no connection. That consumer would then be unable to sue
the company in the state where the product was purchased if alleged defects
in the product caused injury. Courts’ discomfort with results like this led to
the creation of the stream of commerce doctrine.178 Under that doctrine, a
forum could assert personal jurisdiction over any defendant who should
have foreseen that its product would end up being sold in that forum in the
regular course of commerce.179
The Supreme Court first mentioned the stream of commerce theory in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,180 where the Court sent a
mixed message about the theory’s viability. In that case, the Court rejected
the exercise of jurisdiction by Oklahoma courts over a car dealership in
New Jersey simply because the plaintiffs drove the car to Oklahoma and it
is foreseeable that a car could be driven anywhere.181 In doing so, the Court
flatly rejected the notion that foreseeability alone is sufficient to give rise to
personal jurisdiction.182 However, the Court also noted a state would not
“exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it assert[ed] personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
175

See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Cody Jacobs, A Fork in the
Stream: The Unjustified Failure of the Concurrence in J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v.
Nicastro to Clarify the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 171,
177-79 (2014) [hereinafter Fork in the Stream].
176
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980);
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253-54.
177
Or sell a part to a manufacturer of a more finished product.
178
See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766
(Ill. 1961).
179
See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory:
A Reappraisal and A Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 259 & n.77 (1989).
180
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
181
Id. at 295-96.
182
Id.
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commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum State.”183 Thus, while refusing to allow the assertion of
jurisdiction based on the foreseeable use of a product in a forum, the Court
seemed to endorse the assertion of jurisdiction based on the foreseeable sale
of a product in a forum.184
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,185 the Court had an
opportunity to take on the stream of commerce doctrine directly. In that
case, a Taiwanese company manufactured a tube used inside a tire that was
allegedly the cause of an injury in California due to a defect.186 After the
consumer sued the Taiwanese company in California, the Taiwanese
company filed a cross complaint seeking indemnification against a Japanese
company that manufactured the tube’s valve assembly.187 The Japanese
company claimed that California’s courts could not properly exercise
jurisdiction over it because it had made no direct contacts with
California.188
The Court unanimously agreed that California could not exercise
jurisdiction over the Japanese company but the Justices were sharply
divided on the reasons why. Eight justices agreed that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company would fail the second step
of the minimum contacts analysis because forcing the Japanese company to
defend itself in California courts in a dispute with a Taiwanese company
only tangentially related to California would not be consistent with fair play
and substantial justice.189 However, when it came to the minimum contacts
portion of the analysis and the stream of commerce theory, no opinion could
garner the votes of five justices.
Justice O’Connor, in a portion of her opinion joined by three other justices,
argued that placing a product in the stream of commerce should only be a
sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction when the defendant engages in
“additional conduct [indicating] an intent or purpose to serve the market in
the forum State” such as designing the product for the market in that state,
183
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advertising in that state, or marketing the product through a distributor
there.190 The Japanese company’s mere awareness that the stream of
commerce may have resulted in its product being sold in a California was,
by itself, insufficient.191 Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by three
other justices, disagreed. He argued that if a defendant places a product in
the stream of commerce and should reasonably expect that it could be sold
in a particular forum, the minimum contacts requirement should be satisfied
without any requirement of additional conduct.192 Accordingly, because the
Japanese company was aware that the final product would ultimately be
sold in California, its contacts were sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
minimum contacts test.193 The Court’s split in Asahi194 led to a split in
lower courts, with some adopting Justice O’Connor’s version of the stream
of commerce test, and others adopting Justice Brennan’s approach.195
The Court again returned to the stream of commerce doctrine over twenty
years later in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.196 In that case, the
plaintiff was injured in his workplace by a metal sheering machine.197 The
machine was manufactured by an English company and then sold to a
distributor based in Ohio, who then sold the machine to the plaintiff’s
employer.198 In a products liability suit against the manufacturer, the
employer argued that it could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in New
Jersey.199
Although the Court rejected the exercise of jurisdiction by a vote of six to
three, the Court again produced a fractured decision with no opinion
garnering a majority of the Justices. In an opinion for a plurality of four
Justices, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court should endorse Justice
O’Connor’s Asahi opinion and only permit the exercise of jurisdiction
190
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opinion. Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195
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where “the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum” with some
other conduct.200 Applying that test, Justice Kennedy concluded that New
Jersey could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because
the defendant’s sale of the metal sheering machine to its Ohio distributor at
most showed an intent to target the United States as a whole rather than
New Jersey specifically.201 In a dissenting opinion for three Justices,
Justice Ginsburg strongly disagreed. Echoing Justice Brennan’s approach,
she argued that by instructing its distributor to sell its products anywhere in
the United States, the defendant should have foreseen that its products
would be sold in New Jersey, the state with the largest scrap metal
market.202
In a concurring opinion for himself and Justice Alito, Justice Breyer agreed
with the plurality that New Jersey courts could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, but felt that the case did not present a good
vehicle for resolving the conflict in Asahi.203 Justice Breyer felt that both
approaches suggested in Asahi would lead to the same result in this case
because the machine at issue was not sold as part of a regular flow of the
defendant’s products into New Jersey and therefore the defendant could not
have had a reasonable expectation that one of its products would end up
there.204
*****
Thus, after Nicastro, courts were left with little more guidance about the
stream of commerce doctrine than they had after Asahi.205 However, a few
common threads relevant to domestic violence jurisdiction can be gleaned
from these opinions.
First, a defendant’s knowledge about the
consequences of his or her intentional actions is relevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry. Under Justice Brennan’s approach, the knowledge
(or constructive knowledge) that the sale of a product into the stream of
commerce will ultimately result in that product being sold in a forum is
alone sufficient to subject a defendant to jurisdiction. Justice O’Connor’s
approach requires an intentional act by the defendant that—in light of the
defendant’s knowledge—reflects an intention to target the forum. Thus,
200
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both approaches accept that the defendant’s knowledge about the
geographic reach of his actions plays a role in the jurisdictional calculus.
Second, and relatedly, the stream of commerce doctrine is built upon the
idea that intentional actions by the defendant that have an effect in another
forum can be the basis for subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction in that
forum. Although Woodson teaches us that a mere negligent act by a
defendant that has some effect in another forum is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction, such an effect can confer jurisdiction when combined with
some evidence of an intention to cause such an effect. For example, Justice
O’Connor’s noted in Asahi that her conclusion may have been different had
the defendant “control[ed] or employ[ed] the distribution system that
brought its valves to California.”206 In other words, if the defendant’s
intentional activities had been what brought the valves to California and
caused the injury there, it could have been subject to jurisdiction. Similarly,
the dissent in Nicastro argued that jurisdiction was appropriate “at the place
[the defendant’s] products cause[d] injury[,]” New Jersey, because the
defendant controlled a distribution system that intentionally targeted the
entire country.207
Third, the stream of commerce doctrine is concerned with not just any
effects in a forum, but effects that have some impact on the forum itself,
rather than merely individuals within the forum. As the Nicastro plurality
put it, the defendant’s actions must be “directed at the society or economy”
of the forum.208 Actions with these kind of effects in a forum—like selling
products into a state through a distribution system—“invoke the benefits
and protections of [the state’s] laws”209 and therefore either manifest an
intent to submit to the sovereign authority of the forum210 or make it fair
and reasonable to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in that forum.211
206
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Similarly, “in some cases . . . the defendant might well [be subject to
jurisdiction] by reason of his attempt to obstruct [a forum’s] laws.”212 Thus,
when a defendant’s actions have effects on the legal, economic, or societal
ecosystem of a state, the defendant is much more likely to be subject to
jurisdiction in that state.
B. The Effects Test
The Court has, in fact, confronted personal jurisdiction issues in situations
involving a defendant’s effort to “obstruct” another state’s laws through the
commission of an intentional tort allegedly targeting at a plaintiff in that
state. In these cases, the Court has developed a separate gloss on the
purposeful availment requirement specific to intentional torts known as the
“Calder effects test,” 213 a name that stems from the case that laid out that
test, Calder v. Jones.214
In Calder, an actress sued two reporters with the National Enquirer for libel
in California based on allegedly defamatory statements contained in an
article that was published in the Enquirer.215 The defendants,216 who lived
in Florida and wrote the article at issue there, argued that California courts
could not assert personal jurisdiction over them.217 The defendants
apparently wrote the entire article without setting foot in California, and
instead conducted all of their research and interviews by phone.218
Nevertheless, the Court found the assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendants proper.219
The Court concluded that jurisdiction in California was consistent with due
process because California was “the focal point both of the [allegedly
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libelous] story and of the harm suffered.”220 That was because the allegedly
libelous story was very focused on California since it was drawn from
California based sources and concerned the activities of a California
resident whose career was centered in California.221 Moreover, the
plaintiff’s emotional distress and injury to her professional reputation would
be felt almost entirely in California.222
The defendants argued that, since they did not distribute the articles
themselves, this case was more analogous to Woodson where the mere fact
that the dealer could foresee that a car might travel to another state was not
enough to subject it to jurisdiction in that state.223 In rejecting this
argument, the Court established a key distinction between intentional torts
and other kinds of lawsuits:
[Defendants] are not charged with mere
untargeted negligence. Rather, their
intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions
were expressly aimed at California.
[Defendants wrote and] edited an article that
they knew would have a potentially
devastating impact upon [plaintiff]. And they
knew that the brunt of that injury would be
felt by [plaintiff] in the State in which she
lives and works and in which the National
Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the
circumstances, [defendants] must ‘reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there’ to
answer for the truth of the statements made in
their article. An individual injured in
California need not go to Florida to seek
redress from persons who, though remaining
in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in
California.224
Thus, the Court established the principal that, when an intentional tort is
“expressly targeted” toward a particular state, this express targeting can
constitute sufficient purposeful availment to justify the exercise of
220
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jurisdiction by that state even where the defendant otherwise lacks
significant contacts with the forum.225
After staying silent on the subject for thirty years after Calder, the Court
finally returned to the effects test in Walden v. Fiore.226 In that case, the
plaintiffs were two Nevada residents who alleged that a federal Drug
Enforcement Agency agent improperly seized their money and detained
them while they were traveling through Atlanta’s airport.227 The plaintiffs
also alleged that the same DEA agent filled out an affidavit with false
information in an effort to justify the seizures.228 The plaintiffs sued the
DEA agent in Nevada alleging violations of their constitutional rights.229
The DEA agent argued that he could not be subject to personal jurisdiction
in Nevada, despite his knowledge that the plaintiffs resided there.230
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the defendant.231
The Court reiterated the long established principal that the plaintiff’s
residency alone cannot be the only link between the defendant and a forum
to establish jurisdiction.232 Instead, the defendant must engage in conduct
that forms the necessary connection with the forum state.233 The Court
described Calder as being consistent with that principal because in that case
225

E.g., Andrew F. Halaby, You Won't Be Back: Making Sense of "Express Aiming"
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“the reputation-based ‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendants
to California, not just to the plaintiff.”234 The Court noted that because of
the nature of libel, the tort in Calder actually occurred in California, where
the article was read and distributed, not in Florida where the article was
written.235 For these reasons, the defendants conduct in in Calder was
actually connected to California itself, rather than just to a California-based
plaintiff.236
By contrast, in this case, the Court held the conduct that gave rise to the
lawsuit—the seizure and filing of the false affidavit—took place entirely in
Georgia.237 The Court rejected the idea that the defendant’s knowledge that
the plaintiffs were from Nevada and would suffer injury in Nevada as a
result of his conduct was sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
over him.238 The fact that the plaintiffs suffered injury from not having
their money in Nevada was not “tethered to Nevada” in any meaningful
way; “unlike the broad publication of the forum-focused story in Calder the
effects of the [defendant’s] conduct on [plaintiffs were] not connected to
[Nevada] in a way that [made] those effects a proper basis for
jurisdiction.”239
The Court’s efforts to distinguish Walden from Calder are not entirely
persuasive, as several scholars have observed.240 After all, Calder seemed
to turn on the defendant’s knowledge that the plaintiff would be injured in
the forum, not the defendant’s intentional targeting of the forum as a
whole.241 However persuasive the Court’s description of Calder may be, it
does offer a coherent post hoc justification of the differing results in the two
cases. In both Walden and Calder, the defendants knew that the plaintiffs
234
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would be injured in the forums at issue, however; only in Calder did the
effects of the defendant’s conduct extend beyond the plaintiffs to impact the
state’s economy, society, or political system.
*****
Thus, after Walden, the effects test turns on (1) whether the defendant has
knowledge that his conduct will have an impact in a forum, (2) whether his
conduct does in fact have such an impact, and (3) whether that impact is
targeted at the forum as a whole or just at individual plaintiffs who happen
to reside there. These requirements bring the effects test somewhat into
alignment with the stream of commerce doctrine in that both require
knowledge on the part of the defendant about the likely results of his or her
conduct and both require conduct that reflects an intention to target a forum
as a whole. This is consistent with the Walden Court’s statement that the
same jurisdictional principals that apply to other torts apply when
intentional torts are involved.242
However, Walden’s dicta to the contrary notwithstanding, there are still
differences in the way the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine treats
intentional torts243 and non-intentional torts. To understand that difference,
it is important to separate two kinds of “intentionality” the Court is
concerned with in personal jurisdiction cases. One kind, is “action
intentionality”—that is, whether the conduct giving rise to the claim was
intentional or not. This is the distinction between intentional torts and other
torts (those based on negligence or strict liability). The other kind is “forum
targeting intentionality”—that is, whether the defendant did something to
intentionally target the specific forum that is asserting jurisdiction over him.
What the stream of commerce and effects test cases show is that where
action intentionality is present, the requirements for forum targeting
intentionality are somewhat relaxed.
In the stream of commerce context, where action intentionality is not
present, the Court is very stringent about ensuring that forum targeting
intentionality exists. Disagreements over whether such intent exists, how to
prove such intent, and the level of intentionality required are precisely the
problems that gave rise to the warring opinions in Asahi and Nicastro. As
the doctrine has developed, it has become much harder for mere knowledge
242
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that a product could end up in a particular forum to satisfy due process
requirements. In contrast, when it comes to intentional torts, which, by
definition, include action intentionality, knowledge is a much more
palatable basis for satisfying the forum targeting intentionality requirement.
This is reflected in both Calder and Walden where the focus of the Court’s
analysis was on how the claimed conduct of the defendants in those cases
had an impact on the forums at issue, not on the state of mind of the
defendants with respect to the forums. In both cases the only evidence of
forum targeting intentionality was the defendants’ knowledge that their
conduct could have effects in California and Nevada respectively. The
difference was that in Calder, the researching and publication of the article
had a large impact in California, whereas in Walden, the seizure of the cash
and drafting of the affidavit had a minimal impact in Nevada. By contrast,
under the stream of commerce doctrine—at least in its more stringent
formulations—knowledge alone is insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction
even where the effects of the defendant’s conduct are widely felt in the
forum.
Therefore, another important guiding principal that can be gleaned from the
effects test is that where action intentionality is present, the requirement of
forum targeting intentionality is relaxed to the point that mere knowledge is
largely sufficient provided that the conduct at issue has far reaching effects
in the forum.244 This makes sense within the larger context of personal
jurisdiction doctrine because it reflects the overriding focus on the
defendant’s agency that has been present since the purposeful availment
requirement was added. A defendant should be able to make a choice that
determines whether or not he or she will be subject to jurisdiction in the
forum, and not have that choice made for him by third parties.245 In the
context of negligence or strict liability, the forum targeting intentionality
requirement exists to ensure that a real choice is involved since the
underlying conduct does not involve one. In the context of intentional
conduct, since the offending conduct itself is the result of a conscious
choice, courts can take a relaxed view of the forum targeting intentionality
requirement, and still protect the defendant’s agency.
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V. REFRAMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE JURISDICTION: THE KNOWLEDGE TEST
The stream of commerce doctrine and the effects test have been often
(rightly) criticized for being muddled and unclear. However, the broad
principals embedded in these two lines of cases provide a framework for
formulating a new test for domestic violence jurisdiction. A defendant’s
mere knowledge that his conduct could have an effect in a forum is
generally insufficient to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
him in that forum.246 However, the stream of commerce doctrine teaches us
that where the defendant knows that his or her conduct is likely to cause an
effect in another forum and takes specific action to target that forum, the
assertion of jurisdiction may be proper. In turn, the effects test posits that
where an intentional tort is committed and the effects of the intentional tort
are felt not just by the victim, but by the forum as a whole, the defendant’s
knowledge alone may be sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction.
In the following subsections, I will demonstrate that in domestic violence
cases, the alleged misconduct by the defendant is: (1) intentionally designed
to target forums where the plaintiff might flee, and (2) likely to have effects
in those forums that go well beyond the individual plaintiff involved.
Therefore, it is proper to subject domestic violence defendants to
jurisdiction in any forum where the defendant knows or should know his
victim may flee. I will refer to this test as the Knowledge Test.
A. Intentionality
Although actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders are equitable,
they are similar to intentional tort actions in that both require the plaintiff to
prove the defendant engaged in intentional conduct.247 A restraining order
is never granted on the ground that the defendant threatened or injured the
plaintiff accidentally—instead, the defendant must commit an intentional
act—usually one that is violent or threatening such that the plaintiff is
placed in reasonable fear that the defendant may attack her (or attack her
again).248 Thus, actions seeking domestic violence restraining orders carry
the same inherent action intentionality that triggers the effects test in
intentional tort cases.
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Although the presence of action intentionality relaxes the forum targeting
intentionality requirement, it does not eliminate it. Walden makes clear that
even if an intentional tort defendant knows the plaintiff he is intentionally
harming may travel to another state, that is not sufficient to give rise to
jurisdiction in that state without some additional indication that the
defendant intended to target that state. However, domestic violence is
different from other intentional torts in at least two critical ways that help
satisfy this requirement. First, domestic violence is almost always part of a
larger pattern of coercive control by the batterer rather than an isolated
incident. Second, domestic violence by definition takes place between
people with a pre-existing relationship—often a close one—that gives the
perpetrator more knowledge about the potential effects of his conduct in
other forums.
Unlike an ordinary intentional tort like the ones at issue in Calder and
Walden, domestic violence is not a discrete harm that one person does to
another in a single instance. Rather, it is well established that domestic
violence is a pattern of behavior by the batterer designed to establish control
over the victim.249 That control is not limited to the times when physical
attacks are occurring or even when the batterer is physically present.250
Rather, the batterer places the victim in an ongoing state of terror designed
249
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to ensure her continued subjugation.251 Moreover, domestic violence does
not end when the victim leaves the batterer, and in fact, in many cases is
likely to escalate.252 Batterers are well aware of the fact their relentless
abuse may cause the victim to rationally choose to escape by fleeing
elsewhere. In fact, research shows that batterers’ efforts to control their
victims are at least partially motivated by a desire to keep the victim from
leaving permanently.253
When a person engages in domestic violence with the knowledge that the
victim may seek refuge in another state, the batterer is also aware—and
perhaps hoping—that his pattern of violence will continue to affect the
victim even if she chooses to flee to that state and perhaps ultimately
compel her to return to him. This is very different from the usual
intentional tortfeasor who is simply seeking to impose a one-time injury on
the plaintiff without any aim to exert ongoing control. The DEA agent in
Walden may have known that the plaintiffs lived in Nevada, but by seizing
their cash, he did not intend to visit any ongoing harm to the plaintiffs in
Nevada beyond the loss of the money. By contrast, domestic violence is an
ongoing harm that is designed to subject the victim to the batterer’s control
in any state where she travels.254
Indeed, obtaining a domestic violence restraining order usually requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate a current fear or likelihood of further violence.255
Where a plaintiff flees to another state and seeks a restraining order, this
element of her claim cannot be completed until she arrives in the destination
state and actually files her claim while being in a continuing state of fear or
251

See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 250, at 37-38.
See, e.g., Przekop, supra note 249, at 1055 (“[A] woman escaping an abusive
relationship has a 75 percent greater risk of severe injury or death than a woman who
remains with her abuser.”); see also supra note 155 (collecting sources discussing
separation assault).
253
See Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and
Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 291-92 & n.104 (1987); Kathleen
Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 286-89 & n.101 (1985).
254
Of course, if a specific case truly does raise an isolated incident that is not
connected to a larger pattern of domestic violence and intimidation, then the Knowledge
Test may not be appropriate. However, such cases are likely to be rare, both because of the
nature of domestic violence, and because restraining orders are generally unavailable when
only a single incident is alleged. See, e.g., L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 24 A.3d 849, 858 (N.J.
App. Div. 2011) (refusing to grant a restraining order over an “isolated incident” of
harassment where it was not accompanied by other threatening or violent behaviors and
noting the requirement that the victim demonstrate an order is “necessary to prevent future
abuse”).
255
See, e.g., 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence § 5
252
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danger. Thus, just like the defamation in Calder, the cause of action for a
domestic violence restraining order is actually completed in the forum
where the plaintiff files her claim.
Even so, the victim’s decision to flee to a another state is—on its own—not
sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction in whatever state she travels to, rather,
the defendant must know the specific state to which the plaintiff will flee.256
Domestic violence perpetrators are uniquely positioned to know the
locations where their victims are likely to flee because of the close
relationship between the batterer and the victim. Domestic violence is, by
definition, limited to violence between people who have a close relationship
with each other.257 Accordingly, a batterer is very likely to know the victim
well enough to have some idea of where the victim might go to seek refuge
from his attacks. This is particularly true where the victim seeks refuge
with close friends or family, as victims of domestic violence often do.258
The typical domestic violence defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s
likely avenues of escape is nicely illustrated by many of the cases discussed
in Part II.B, supra, where the applicability of the status exception was
litigated. For example, in Burnett v. Burnett, the case described in the
Introduction, it is highly likely that the defendant was well aware that the
plaintiff—who he had been married to for seven years—might flee to Ohio
where her family lived.259 In fact, the defendant had previously attended
family gatherings in Ohio at the plaintiff’s family home.260 And in Bartsch,
the Iowa Supreme Court case that led the way in applying the status
exception to domestic violence, the parties had met in Iowa while both were
attending school there and the plaintiff’s parents—who she went to live
256

See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires
a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”).
257
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (limiting the definition of domestic
violence for purposes of federal firearm prohibitions to violent acts “committed by a
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with
the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim.”); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domestic Abuse and Violence §§ 8-10
(describing various state definition of domestic or family violence which include violence
between household members, parents of children, dating partners, and other people in
personal relationships).
258
See Graybill, supra note 120, at 823 (“When victims of domestic violence flee the
homes they share with their abusers, they often seek refuge with friends, family, or in
shelters, and many move to another city or state to hide from their abuser.”).
259
See Burnett, 2012-Ohio-2673, 2012 WL 2196336, at *1-3. Indeed, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant “knew all the places she would go” to flee from him. Id. at *1.
260
See id. at *3.
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with when she sought the protective order—continued to live in Iowa
throughout the parties’ five year marriage.261 Even in Fox, where the
parties were an uncle and his nephew instead of a couple in an intimate
relationship, the contentious court battle over estate issues the parties were
involved in that precipitated the nephew’s alleged attack likely would have
revealed to the nephew his uncle’s address in Vermont if he was not already
aware of it from their familial relationship.262 Moreover, right as the attack
was occurring in the courthouse parking lot, the nephew told the uncle he
was memorizing his Vermont license plate in case he “need[ed] it again.”263
These examples illustrate what is likely true in many domestic violence
cases—that the attacker has a very good idea of the states where the victim
may choose to flee.264
As the Knowledge Test recognizes, the defendant may not be aware of the
plaintiffs’ likely destination in every case. In cases where the defendant
does not know where the plaintiff has fled, a restraining order may be
unnecessary or even harmful since it could alert the defendant to the
plaintiff’s location.265 However, in cases where the defendant engages in
domestic violence knowing the plaintiff might flee to a particular state, he is
engaging in intentional conduct targeting that forum since he intends his
campaign of terror to extend into that forum. This is sufficient to satisfy the
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See Appellee’s Final Brief at 4-5, Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (No. 00-0068). In fact,
the defendant’s parents also lived in Iowa throughout the marriage not far from where the
plaintiff’s parents lived. Id.
262
See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Fox, 106 A.3d 919 (No. 13-147), 2013 WL
3874104 (Vt.).
263
Id.
264
This is true in at least two other major cases discussing applicability of the status
exception. See Hemenway, 159 N.H. at 683 (noting that the defendant sent a threatening
letter to the plaintiff’s New Hampshire address); Caplan, 450 Mass. at 464 (noting that the
parties met in Massachusetts approximately six years before the action was filed, that the
plaintiff took periodic trips to Massachusetts during the parties’ marriage and that “the
defendant had telephoned the plaintiff's father's house in Massachusetts [and] had
telephoned his own friends in Massachusetts apparently trying to locate the plaintiff” after
she fled to Massachusetts). Other cases did not include enough information to know for
sure whether the defendant would have had some idea about where the plaintiff might flee.
See Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 16 (noting that the plaintiff fled to Kentucky to stay with “a
close friend” after suffering abuse at the hands of her husband who she knew for at least
seven years); Shah, 184 N.J. at 129 (noting that the plaintiff sought refuge with “family
friends” in New Jersey after about two years of marriage). It is likely that at least part of
the reason the record was not as well developed on that issue in those cases is because of
the plaintiffs’ reliance on the status exception.
265
See Annie Pelletier Kerrick, Protections Available to Victims of Domestic Violence:
No Contact Orders, Civil Protection Orders, and Other Options, 54 ADVOCATE 32 (2011).
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forum targeting intentionality requirement since the defendant’s underlying
conduct giving rise to the cause of action is intentional.
B. Effects
As cases like Walden and Nicastro demonstrate, causing injury in a
forum—even on purpose—is insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction.
Instead, the key question is what kind of injury batterers cause in these fora?
If the injury is confined just to the plaintiff herself, then it may be
insufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction. But, if the injury spreads to
the society and economy of the forum, then the assertion of personal
jurisdiction is justified. There is no doubt that the latter type of harm is
visited on forums where domestic violence victims flee to escape abuse.
The enormous costs to society of domestic violence are well documented266
and are likely to be even higher for states receiving fleeing domestic
violence survivors. Because batterers are more likely to attack their victims
right after they leave 267 and recidivism rates in domestic violence cases are
high,268 the receiving state is likely to be a site of further abuse that may
require police and/or court intervention. Victims of domestic violence are
also often financially reliant on their abusers.269 When victims leave their
abusers by moving away, victims often find themselves with no job, no
reliable transportation, and little or no assets.270 In turn, this forces many
266

See, e.g., Stoever, supra note 167, at 1081-82 (“Costs related to experiencing
domestic violence and to ending violence are substantial. In the United States, the annual
cost of medical care, mental health services, and time away from work due to intimate
partner violence is estimated to be $8.3 billion (in 2003 dollars). Every year, survivors of
intimate partner violence lose nearly 8 million days of paid work, which amounts to more
than 32,000 full-time jobs. They also lose approximately 5.6 million days of household
productivity due to domestic violence, and there are significant costs for services to
children exposed to domestic violence.”) (citations omitted).
267
See supra note 252; Mahoney, supra note 155, at 64 (“At least half of women who
leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by them.”).
268
See, e.g., Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644 (“[T]he recidivism rate [in domestic violence
cases] is high[.] . . . Estimates of this rate come from survey research and range from 40%
to 80%[.] . . . No matter how you slice these numbers, people convicted of domestic
violence remain dangerous to their spouses and partners.”) (citations omitted).
269
See, e.g., Ralph Henry, Domestic Violence and the Failures of Welfare Reform: The
Role for Work Leave Legislation, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 67, 68 (2005)
270
See, e.g., Eliza Hirst, Note, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence:
Disparate Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence,
10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 133-34 (2003) (“Abusers often control the
finances or prohibit their victims from working, which leaves many victims of domestic
violence without any money when fleeing abusers.”); Comment, supra note 163, at 598
(“[W]hen a woman finally gets up the courage to leave her batterer, she often has no job,
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victims to rely on welfare and other forms of public assistance.271 And
domestic violence survivors are more likely than most to struggle to obtain
employment and get off of welfare.272 Even survivors who do find
employment struggle to maintain such employment and often make their
employer a target for harassment from the batterer.273 Survivors of
domestic violence also often struggle to find suitable permanent housing
after leaving their abusers, with many relying on public housing and many
others becoming homeless.274
Thus, when a batterer abuses someone with the knowledge that she will
likely flee to another state, and she does flee there, his conduct imposes
substantial effects and costs on that state’s economy and society. The
effects of battering reach well beyond the victim and are analogous to (and
perhaps greater than) those imposed by companies who utilize a distribution
system that targets a particular state’s economy or intentional tortfeasors
whose conduct targets a forum as a whole. Just as we hold these defendants
accountable for their actions, so too should batterers be responsible for their

no car, no house, and no bank account.”); see also Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course
in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV.
145, 148 (2015) (“[M]any women who experience domestic violence find themselves
homeless and jobless when the dust settles.”).
271
See, e.g., Henry, supra note 269, at 73; Comment, supra note163, at 598.
272
See Henry, supra note 269, at 73 (“Further studies have provided empirical
evidence that domestic violence can make it very difficult for a woman to successfully
leave the welfare rolls or even to maintain part-time employment if forced off of
welfare.”); see also Comment, supra note 163, at 601 (“Long-term abuse can produce
depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, inability to concentrate, substance abuse
problems, and difficulty in making decisions.”).
273
See Rutledge, supra note 153, at 182-87 (describing the impact of domestic
violence on the victim’s employer).
274
See Shirley Darby Howell, Making Women Homeless and Keeping Them Homeless
Domestic Violence, Flawed Interpretations of 42 U.S.C. S1437d(l)(6), Sexual Harassment
in Public Housing, and Municipal Violations of the Eighth Amendment, 65 GUILD PRAC.
77, 78 (2008) (“At least fifty percent of homeless women became homeless as a direct
result of domestic abuse[.]”); Elizabeth J. Thomas, Building A Statutory Shelter for Victims
of Domestic Violence: The United States Housing Act and Violence Against Women Act in
Collaboration, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 289, 305 (2004) (“Victims of domestic violence
often do not possess the financial resources necessary to obtain suitable housing; however,
[public housing] provides these victims with a potential source of housing in their quest to
escape a violent relationship.”); Hirst, supra note 270, at 134 (“When friends, relatives, and
private housing do not offer viable options, federally subsidized housing may be the last
resort for victims, short of homelessness.”); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043e(7) (“Victims of
domestic violence often return to abusive partners because they cannot find long-term
housing.”).
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own choices and subject to jurisdiction in states where they knowingly force
their victims to flee.275
VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE KNOWLEDGE TEST
Professor Miles makes several arguments against relying on the effects test
in domestic violence cases which could also be raised against utilizing the
Knowledge Test.276 First, Professor Miles points out that courts have been
reluctant to embrace the effects test in interstate domestic violence cases in
part because jurisdiction cannot be premised “solely on emotional injury in
the forum based on a wrongful act in another state.”277 However, as
discussed above, when a domestic violence victim is forced to flee to
another state, she suffers far more than a mere emotional injury in the
destination state. Instead, the effects are like those in Calder:
comprehensive, ongoing, and targeted to the forum itself rather than just the
victim.
Second, Professor Miles argues that some long arm statutes take a narrower
view of the effects test than might be allowed by the Due Process Clause,
which would limit the availability of the effects test—and presumably by
extension, the Knowledge Test—to domestic violence victims fleeing to
those states.278 This critique is a valid one but it highlights a problem with
those states’ limited long arm statutes rather than with the Knowledge Test.
Even if states are reluctant to expand their jurisdictional statutes with
respect to the effects test in general, nothing would stop them from enacting
statutes that specifically provide for jurisdiction over out of state domestic
violence perpetrators as most states have done for other specific acts
committed by non-residents.279
Third, Professor Miles argues that whether the victim’s flight to a particular
state was foreseeable to the defendant may be “strongly contested” and
“murky” in many cases.280 However, the issue of the defendant’s
275

Cf. Stoever, supra note 167, at 1053-58 (describing the the “minimal length of
protection afforded to domestic violence survivors [by domestic violence restraining
orders], in comparison to business and property interests” being afforded permanent
protection through injunctive relief).
276
See Miles, supra note 35, at 164-67.
277
Id. at 164-66 (citing Caplan, 879 N.E. at 121 n.5).
278
Miles, supra note 35, at 165-66.
279
See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes
Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496 (2004) (noting that
“forty-three states . . . have long-arm statutes [that] enumerate[e] the acts that subject a
nonresident to jurisdiction in the state.”).
280
Miles, supra note 35, at 166.
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knowledge with respect to the forum would likely be easier for courts to
determine in domestic violence cases than in stream of commerce cases
where courts already routinely assess the defendant’s knowledge of and
intent to target the forum. In those cases, the defendant is usually a large
corporation whose actions represent the sum of decisions made by dozens if
not hundreds of different people, making concepts like “intent” and
“knowledge” difficult to determine and highly contestable in individual
cases.281 Moreover, the evidence necessary to prove intent and
knowledge—if it exists at all—is usually entirely under the control of the
corporate defendant and must be unearthed via extensive (and expensive)
jurisdictional discovery.282 In a typical domestic violence case applying the
Knowledge Test by contrast, the court only needs to look at the knowledge
of one individual natural person—the defendant. Moreover, proof of the
defendant’s knowledge is likely to be found in the history of the parties’
relationship (i.e., things the plaintiff told the defendant, places they visited
together, etc.)—evidence of which is equally available to both parties.
Thus, although assessing the knowledge of a party is a difficult enterprise in
any case, there is every reason to believe it would be less difficult in the
domestic violence context than in other contexts where parties’ knowledge
is already routinely assessed by courts.
Finally, Professor Miles argues that defendants are less likely to comply
with protective orders if they perceive those orders as being entered in the
“absence of procedural justice.”283 It is almost certainly true that defendants
are more likely to comply with orders they perceive as the result of a
281

See Erik T. Moe, Case Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The
Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely Alive but Still Kicking Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 208 (1987) (noting that “a
corporation’s intentions are difficult to measure” when determining purposeful availment);
see also Doug-Long, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 72 T.C. 158, 181 (1979)
(“Corporate purpose or intent is a subjective question, difficult of proof.”); JJJ Corp. v.
United States, 576 F.2d 327, 338 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (noting “the inherent difficulty of proving a
corporation’s intent or state of mind”); cf. Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal
Intent: Toward A Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287,
1296-97 (1990) (“The idea of ‘intent,’ a troublesome concept at best, is even more
formidable when applied to corporate criminal prosecutions. . . . [C]ourts have had a
[difficult] time deciding if there was a ‘mind’ in a corporation, and if so, who could
possibly represent this mind in the context of forming criminal intent.”).
282
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190
(1976) (“It is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain the intent of a large corporation by the
methods of litigation. What juries (and many judges) do not understand is that the
availability of evidence of improper intent is often a function of luck and of the defendant's
legal sophistication, not the underlying reality.”).
283
Miles, supra note 35, at 166-67.
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procedurally just process.284 However, this argument cuts in favor of the
Knowledge Test and against using the status exception for domestic
violence cases. A defendant is more likely to perceive a court’s exercise of
jurisdiction as fair when its assertion of power turns on an examination of
the defendant’s own knowledge and conduct rather than an arcane legal
doctrine that simply reclassifies the matter as a status determination that
does not involve the defendant at all. And because the Knowledge Test is
merely an extension of existing personal jurisdiction doctrine, the defendant
would be getting similar treatment to defendants in other cases instead of
being subject to a special “exception” to generally applicable due process
protections. Therefore, applying the Knowledge Test rather than the status
exception in domestic violence cases will increase the likelihood that
defendants will perceive the jurisdictional aspect of the process as fair.
Another potential argument against the Knowledge Test that Professor
Miles does not raise but others have is the “self-serving” problem that is
inherent in the effects test. The purported problem is essentially that a
plaintiff can subject a defendant to the more relaxed personal jurisdiction
standard of the effects test by simply asserting that the defendant has
committed an intentional tort even if he has not in fact done so.285
Whatever the merits of this objection to the effects test in general, it is a
weak objection to the Knowledge Test because false allegations of domestic
violence are extremely rare.286 Moreover, it is unlikely that a person would
284

See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections On
Procedure Versus Procedural Justice, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at
1 & n.2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617355
(“[E]mpirical studies demonstrate that whether people are satisfied with process and
perceive it as being procedurally fair significantly impact their opinion of whether courts
are legitimate sources of power and authority, often even more so than whether they win or
lose.”) (collecting sources).
285
See, e.g., Halaby, supra note 225, at 632 (arguing that the effects test “invite[s]
personal jurisdiction determinations based on plaintiffs’ self-serving allegations of
nefarious conduct by [the] defendant rather than through liability-neutral analyses.”);
David Post, The “Effects Test” rises up – temporarily, one hopes – from its sickbed,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/04/14/the-effects-test-rises-up-temporarily-one-hopes-from-itssickbed/ (“Simply allege an unauthorized use of your trademark – that it was not used by
accident, but via an ‘intentional’ act – and presto! you can subject the defendant to the
personal jurisdiction of your home court[.] . . . It can’t be that easy, and it shouldn’t be that
easy.”).
286
See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, Bringing Canada's Divorce Act into the New Millennium:
Enacting A Child-Focused Parenting Law, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 425, 450 & n.65 (2015)
(“[S]tudies that have been undertaken clearly indicate that there are substantially more false
denials and minimizations of spousal abuse by genuine abusers (generally men) than
exaggerations or false allegations by victims (generally women).”) (collecting sources);
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uproot her entire life to move to another state just to make a false accusation
of domestic violence, when she could just as easily make the same false
accusation without moving. Instead, someone who goes to all the trouble of
moving to another state is far more likely to have a real fear for her safety.
Finally, it may be argued that the provision of the federal Violence Against
Women Act requiring inter-state recognition of domestic violence
judgments offers adequate protection to domestic violence victims fleeing
to other states.287 However, as even the Fox court admitted, seeking a
restraining order in the original state where the violence took place “may in
some cases be logistically challenging, psychologically difficult, or even
personally dangerous.”288 When a person is subject to domestic violence to
such a severe degree that she is forced to leave her home and flee to another
state, her personal safety will likely be her top priority, rather than ensuring
that she files the paperwork to obtain a restraining order prior to leaving.
Thus, while the inter-state judgment recognition provision of VAWA is a
valuable tool in some circumstances,289 it is not a substitute for the assertion
of personal jurisdiction where the defendant knows his violent acts may
cause the plaintiff to flee to a particular state.
VII. CONCLUSION
A victim of domestic violence should not be barred access to legal
protection simply because she was forced to seek physical protection by
moving away from her abuser. However, attempting to fit domestic
violence into the status exception is not a coherent or particularly effective
way to help solve the problem of jurisdiction in inter-state flight domestic
Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and Custody: Importing the American Law Institute’s
principles of the Law of Family Dissolution into Oregon Law, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
643, 663 n.93 (1999) (“[W]omen seldom make false allegations of either domestic violence
or child physical or sexual abuse.”) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Peter G.
Jaffe et. al., Custody Disputes Involving Allegations of Domestic Violence: Toward A
Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 Fam. Ct. Rev. 500, 508 (2008) (“[I]t is
critical to emphasize that the making of false allegations of spousal abuse is much less
common than the problem of genuine victims who fail to report abuse, and the widespread
false denials and minimization of abuse by perpetrators.”) (citation omitted).
287
See Fox, 106 A.3d at 927 (“A victim of domestic abuse can secure an abuseprevention order that is enforceable in Vermont by petitioning in a state that does have
personal jurisdiction over the alleged abuser.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2265).
288
Fox, 106 A.3d at 927.
289
But see Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and
Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 827, 840-48 (2004) (describing substantial difficulty that has been
encountered in implementing this provision).
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violence cases. Instead, courts should exercise jurisdiction over batterers
who force their victims to flee to another state where the batterer knew or
should have known that the victim was likely to flee. This approach
logically follows from the principles embodied in the stream of commerce
doctrine and the effects test and will hold batters accountable for the
consequences of their actions in a way that is consistent with due process of
law.

